Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Honors Theses

Lee Honors College

6-1992

The Effects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative on Jamaica's Trade
Arlene Hendricks
Western Michigan University, arlenehendrickspotter@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Hendricks, Arlene, "The Effects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative on Jamaica's Trade" (1992). Honors
Theses. 906.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses/906

This Honors Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Lee Honors College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

THE CARL AND WINIFRED LEE HONORS COLLEGE

t$bj
CERTIFICATE OF ORAL EXAMINATION

Arlene Hendricks, having been admitted to the Carl and Winifred Lee

Honors College in 1987, has satisfactorily completed the senior
oral examination for the Lee Honors College on June 12,

1992.

The title of the paper is:

"The Effect of the Carribean Basin Initiative on Jamaica's Trade"

Dr.

Buttierfield

Polit/icalj Science

Dr.

Sisay Asefa
Economics

Dr.

Finance

W:

and Commercial

THE EFFECTS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE ON

JAMAICA'S TRADE

by
Arlene Hendricks

HONORS THESIS COMMITTEE:

Dr. Jim Butterfield, Department of Political Science
Dr. Sisay Asefa, Department of Economics
Dr. William McCarty, Dept of Finance and Commercial Law

A paper submitted in fulfillment of
the Honors College Thesis Requirement
for graduation
June 1992

Official name: Jamaica

Political status: Independent (gained independencefrom Britain in 1962). Member of the British Com
monwealth and of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Form of government: Alegislature, called Parliament, is made upofa House ofRepresentatives, a
Senate, and theQueen ofEngland. The leader ofthe majority party inthe House ofRepresentatives is

appointed Prime Minister and heads thegovernment. The Queen istitular head ofstateand is repre
sented in Jamaica by a Governor-General. TheConstitution provides for the Prime Ministerto serve for
up to five years before calling a general election.
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Area: 4,411 square miles. Third largest of the Caribbean islands.
Population: 2.4 million (1982)

Capital: Kingston

Second largest city: Montego Bay

25
>

Language: English. Most people also speak an English-based Creole language known as patois.
Currency: Jamaican dollar
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INTRODUCTION

This paper will analyze the export-led model for development by looking atthe intended
versus the actual results of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) as it relates to the Caribbean

country of Jamaica. The CBI was passed into law by the U.S. Congress under the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) in 1983. An exploration is made of the circumstances

leading to the CBI, the main precepts and legislation of the CBI, its implementation and its
effects. This paper also discusses the amendment to the CBERA, known as CBI II, which was

passed into law effective October 1,1990. There will be an assessment of the results of the CBI
as an export-led tool for the Caribbean and an illustration of the effect of the CBI on key
industries and sectors in the Jamaican economy.

There will then be an attempt to make

predictions for the future trade prospects for Jamaica and the future importance of the CBI in
relation to Jamaica's trade.

BACKGROUND

Jamaica

Jamaica is a Third World Caribbean country. It serves as an interesting case study of
how a small independent nation-state is attempting to develop using an export-led model in the
modern world economy.

Jamaica has a relatively open, market-oriented economy which is mainly based on the
export of bauxite/alumina and agricultural products, as well as on tourism. While most prices are

determined by supply and demand, there are price controls on some items, mainly basic food and
fuel items, to protect lower income people. Due to its commitment to the export-led model and
free enterprise, as well as its promise to the IMF to reduce levels of subsidies, the government
has recently removed a number of these items from its subsidy list.

Because of Jamaica's proximity to the United States, close ties have been developed

between the two, particularly after Jamaica's independence from Great Britain in 1962. Other
reasons for the continuous strong link between the United States and Jamaica are attributable to

their extensive trade and investment relationship and Jamaica's commitment to a democratic
system of government.

Jamaica has not always grasped the export-led model and its relationship with the U.S.
has not always been strong. When Prime Minister Michael Manley came into power in 1974, he
disregarded this model and sought to follow a more socialist model, in line with Jamaica's

neighboring island, Cuba. Manley began subsidy programs, land distribution, and proceeded to
build up anexcellent health and welfare system. He also wanted Jamaica to be truly independent

and self-sufficient given its resources. He sought to put levies on multinational corporations
(many of which were U.S. owned) and demanded more taxes from corporations. This led many
businesses (e.g., Alcoa) to withdraw from Jamaica. In 1980, with the election of Edward Seaga,

the government returned to the export-led model, and most of Manley's efforts were undone.

Prime Minister Seaga especially sought to bring Jamaica back "in good graces" with the United
States who had started actions against Jamaica due to its "communist ideals". Seaga sponsored
an all out effort to restore the linkages between the U.S. and Jamaica.

Since the 1980s the Jamaican government has been constantly seeking to attract

investments in exporting industries and agriculture as part of itseffort to diversify theeconomy's
foreign exchange earning capacity. Investment aimed atthedomestic Jamaican market is limited
by the island's small population and per capita income of about US$1,300 (1989).

The economy relies on a few export earners which generate relatively few jobs due to
their high import content (mining equipment for alumina, cut textiles for clothing, and food and

hotel provisions for tourism). Although the major exports for most of the period since WWII
have been bauxite and alumina, the gross value of the export sales from these commodities
cannot be taken as being indicative of a pool of foreign exchange available to finance imports.

There is a dominance of foreign firms in the production and export of these commodities, so only

a portion of this revenue (e.g., the local expenditures of these companies, wages, taxes and
royalties) account for the foreign exchange flows associated with that sector.

Since 1981, the Jamaican economy experienced a phase of moderate expansion up to

1983, followed by stagflation in 1984 and 1985 and a return to positive growth in 1986? The
upturn in the economy which began in 1986 was interrupted briefly by the damage from
Hurricane Gilbert which struck in September 1988. Agriculture and manufacturing were
particularly hard hit by the hurricane.

Jamaica has been experimenting with a variety of tools in its export-led development

efforts. In the 1980s, Jamaica signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the
U.S. in order to ensure that U.S. taxpayers can deduct legitimate business expenses incurred in

attending business meetings and conventions in Jamaica through the CBI. This agreement also
enables Jamaica toaccess Section "936" funding (administered by the U.S. through Puerto Rican

banks) at below-market interest rates for development projects. The Jamaica Facility of the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) also provides financing and insurance.

The Jamaican government also has tax and other incentives ofits own. Presently Jamaica
has three active industrial park/free trade zones (Kingston, Montego Bay and Garmex). These

zones offer investors an opportunity to manufacture, warehouse, assemble, and package for

exports. The companies in the zone are entitled to exemption from customs duty and import
licensing, 100% income tax holidays on profits (in perpetuity) and on factory space.

Since 1989, Jamaica has rapidly liberalized its economy and has given many incentives to

the private sector to play the role as the major force of development. Jamaica is seeking
investments in areas that would increase productive output, use domestic raw materials, earn or

save foreign exchange, develop linkage industries ("twin plants"), generate employment and
introduce new technology. These investment goals are clearly no small task.

Figure 1
WHAT MAKES JAMAICA RUN

1989 Gross Domestic Product by Sector
Q Agriculture, forestry and fishing
7.2%
• Mining and quarrying (mainly bauxite) 6.7%
Q Manufacturing
16.9%

QTrade
• Financial institutions
1 Real estate

15.6%
9-1%
12.4%

• Construction

• Government services

15.4%

8.0%

• Utilities, transportation and
communication

10.0%

Q Misc. services (includes tourism)

5.8%

3 Private non-profits

1.1%

Note:Totals more than 100% because of 8.1% imputed service charges.
Source:Planning Institute of Jamaica.

Taken from Forbes Magazine. 1990

The Development of a U.S. Policy Towards the Caribbean

Economic growth and government policies in small Caribbean countries like Jamaica
have been conditionedby three factors: 1) the very large fluctuations of theircommodities on the
world market which is constantly changing the profitability of the productive sectors of their

economies, 2) the attempts of their governments to cope with those fluctuations and, 3) the
political and economic relations that prevail in these countries, and that determine the nature of
government intervention and the role of the private sector.1 These factors leave these small
countries extremely vulnerable to external conditions. The result is that they must continually
make concessions to the First World powers in order to survive in the current world climate.

1Thoumi. Francisco E."Thwarted Comparative Advantage and Economic Policy/Journal ojInter-American Studies
and World Affairs (Spring/Summer 1989), 147-168.

The need for aclearly defined U.S. policy toward the Caribbean grew out of international
developments in the 1970s when oil prices soared. The Caribbean nations were especially hard

hit because their import-substitution industries depended heavily on imported petroleum and
petroleum-based products. Jamaica was 98% dependent on imported energy. The increase in

oil prices had a particularly adverse effect on the cost of refining bauxite and alumina in Jamaica.
Similar consequences were felt in neighboring Caribbean countries. The result was increased
import bills andthe ensuing balance of paymentcrisis in the region.

The United States was also in a crucial position. America's status as "the" world power

had started to decline due to many factors, one of which was the world economic situation of the
1970s. Itwas further weakened by events in 1979 and 1980. These included revolutions in Iran,

Nicaragua, and Grenada, increased guerilla activity in Central America and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Thus emerged a militant mood reflecting America's wounded pride that
transferred from the Carter Administration into the Reagan Administration.2 In the late 1970s

and early 1980s, the United States also experienced both high unemployment and high interest
rates. The recession would have played a role in any policy initiative of the time.
The United States economic dominance of the Caribbean also began to be threatened by

Japan, the European Economic Community (through the Lome I and II Convention with the
Caribbean), the socialist countries, and by more extensive Caribbean economic integration (the
Caribbean Community). The shaping of U.S. policy towards the Caribbean region, however,

was based on Reagan's international economic policy. Three factors conditioned this policy: 1)
the disastrous state of the world economy in 1980, 2) the deteriorating condition of the U.S.

economy, and 3) increasing dependence of the U.S. economy on world trade for markets and
investments.3

2 Bemal. Richard. The Struggle for theOld International Order: The CBI and Jamaica (n.pub., 1989).
3 Martin and Kandel. Smdies ofDevelopment in the Modem World (1989). Chap.4, "The Current Economic Crisis
and the Caribbean/Central American Periphery: US International Economic Policy During the Republican
Administration of 1981-1984".

Since the turn of the century, the United States has based its international economic
policy on the belief that it must depend on the exploitation of foreign countries for the relief of
stagnant domestic markets.4 The U.S. realized that it needed to restore domestic growth in other

national economies in order to improve the environment for foreign investment and for U.S.
based MNCs. It also needed to reduce trade barriers that inhibit exports and imports in the world

trading systems.5

These needs led to the several principles underlying the Reagan Administration's

international economic policy. There was a need for "security" and reaffirmation of U.S.
interests and leadership in international affairs. This relied on bilateral agreements as opposed to

multilateral approaches to promoting U.S. international security interests. In order to initiate
bilateral agreements, the U.S had to tread cautiously and ensure that it did not violate the
guidelines of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

There was also the importance of a market approach to solving the problems of trade.
This went along with the deregulations of major industries and the conservative stance of the
Reagan era. The emphasis was on increasing private sector involvement in international
investment using supply side economics.

The last principle was the importance of reorganizing domestic economic policy of
countries recognized as vital to the maintenance of U.S. security and economic interests. In

other words, the U.S found it necessary at this time to begin looking atthe potential interests in
its "backyard"--the Caribbean. This last principle underscored the administration's eagerness

to link economic policy to political ideology. The Reagan method sought to use the fear of
"another Cuba" as the reason for the need for involvement in the region. This same belief

undoubtedly ledto theU.S. invasion of the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983.

These principles of U.S. international economic policy were not altogether new as it
related to U.S. policy towards the Caribbean. There have been several economic motives that
4 Bernal, Richard. The Struggle for the old International Order: The CBI and Jamaica (n.pub.. 1989), p.5.
5 Martin and Kandel. See footnote 3.

have always been prominent in the U.S. policy towards the Caribbean and Latin America. These
motives include the following desires of the U.S.: 1) to seek investment opportunities with

higher yields of profit than those in the U.S., 2) to secure export markets and, 3) to acquire raw
material.6 The region on a whole has always been strategically important and served as an
important outlet for U.S. investment.

THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

Relative Context of the CBI

The Caribbean Basin Initiative embodied all of the principles of the Reagan

Administration's international economic policy and served as the test case of a new strategy by
the U.S. to reshape and control areas deemed vital to the U.S.7

The inception of the CBI was influenced by Lome Conventions I and II, which provide

preferential access to EEC markets and preferential tariff treatment to the Caribbean countries.
They provide significant export markets for sugar and bananas from the former European
colonies in the Caribbean. The relationship of the Caribbean with the EEC is conducive to non-

alignment and makes for closer trade relations; there is no political pressure. The Reagan
Administration's development policy for the Caribbean, on the other hand, was the opposite.

Alignment with democracy was of utmost importance. The policy attempted to link diplomacy
with trade. It also involved packaging all the other assistance programs into one and supporting
the investments of U.S. as well as quelling progressive (or revolutionary) movements and
governments inthe region through alliance with the Right.8

6 USITC, Second Report (1986), p.2.'
7Richard Bemal. The Struggle for the Old International Order: The CBI and Jamaica (n.pub., 1989).
8 Martin and Kandel. Studies of Development jn the ModemWorld. 1989.
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The Caribbean Basin Initiative was both an economic and military assistance program by

its original design. It was, however, very much a political program as well, due to its
requirement of alignment. The 1991 International BusinessDictionary and Referenceby Presner

defines the CBI as " a political initiative in the form of U.S. international trade policy." It was

primarily an export-led mini-Marshall plan modeled after the Puerto Rican experiment,
Operation Bootstrap.

The Puerto Rican model refers to the U.S. strategy of modernizing a small, one-crop

economy in the Caribbean- the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The model is comprised of duty

free access to the U.S., cheap labor, and tax incentives in the form of U.S. tax exemptions for
U.S. companies to relocate manufacturing units in thecountry. This strategy, with its foundation
in conservative ideology and neo-classical economics, was the basis of the CBI.

Legislation of the CBI

The CBI was first borne out of a speech by President Reagan to the Organization of
American States on February 24, 1982. Passage of the CBI, then, fulfilled the promise that
Reagan made to the nations of Central America and the Caribbean on this date. He promised "an

unprecedented program of trade, economic assistance and tax measures" that would facilitate
recovery throughout the region.

The plan was designed to expand and diversify productive capacity and export markets

through the cooperative efforts of U.S. and local business organizations. Similar to Operation
Bootstrap, the CBI was to provide a combination of official aid, investment incentives, trade
concessions, and technical and military assistance to select countries and territories in the
Caribbean.9 This was to be done under the guise (in true Reagan style) of improving internal

stability, facilitating economic development of the region and helping to solve causes of illegal
immigration to the U.S.

Ibid.

The CBI was promoted by the Administration in such a way as to

11

appeal to both U.S. and Caribbean capitalist governments. It aimed to please these two groups
whose needs didn't always coincide.

In March of 1982 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was submitted

by the President to Congress. The final legislative measure was signed into law on August 5,
1983 and took effect in January, 1984.,0 It consisted of economic assistance and tax measures
to generate economic growth by increasing private sector investment and trade.

From the beginning, the Reagan plan brought about mixed reactions from observers in

and outside of the prospective beneficiary countries. Caribbean business leaders were overall
supportive of the plan. Jamaica was chosen by the Reagan Administration to be the showcase

for the program, mainly due to Prime Minister Seaga's strong support. (Jamaica was also the

first country visited by the U.S. designating team in August 1983). The plan gained support from
all of the other Caribbean governments, whose countries were also under severe economic

pressure. The word "governments" is used here instead of "countries" because itis arecognized

fact that many of the peoples within these governments did not agree with the governments'
support of the program and the concessions (and/or exploitation) that seemed likely to be
included.11 The governments, then, saw the plan as away of accessing U.S. bilateral assistance

that they assumed would be involved. Because these nations were, at this time, experiencing
the most acute economic crisis since the Great Depression, there were many immediate political

and social problems to be addressed. There existed serious shortages of the resources that were
needed to develop the physical infrastructure necessary for industrialization.

Business groups and many individuals began to voice their reservations of the plan as
soon as the details were made public. Protectionist sentiments in the U.S. became widespread as

many saw the CBI as a serious threat to U.S. industry and labor. Another group, leftist
opponents, saw the "CBI as an imperialistic plan to tighten U.S. economic and political

10 Congressional Quarterly Almanac . (1983). p.252.
11 Dr. Trevor Gardner, "Concessions or a Nation: The CBI and its Impact," lecture at Western Michigan University,
March 18.1992.
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hegemony over theregion."12 Both supporters and opponents of the plan did not doubt that the

CBI would succeed inaccomplishing itsgoals, whatever they believed them to be. The CBI was
oversold andblown out of proportion by both its opponents and proponents.

The major elements of the CBI are trade, concessional aid and investment. The plan as
first proposedby Reagan provided that the CBI would:

1. Establish one-way duty-free access to U.S. markets for Caribbean Basin
(CB) exports for a 12-year period-this was to be the main component which
was referred to as the Free Trade Area (FTA).

2. Provide $350 million to meet balance-of-payments shortfalls in key
countries. (See Table 1 for disbursement schedule)
3. Create an investment tax credit of 10% for U.S. businesses investing in the
Caribbean Basin.

TABLE 1

The AID Package

Administration's

Dominican Republic

As passed by

original proposal

Congress

($ million)

($ million)

40

41

128

75

Honduras

35

38

Jamaica

50

52

Costa Rica

70

75

Belize

10

10

5

; -10

Eastern Caribbean

10

24

Guatemala

—

El Salvador

Haiti

Latin American Caribbean Region
TOTAL

Source:

10
2

AIFLD

--

350

U.S. Agency for International Development.

12 Jerry Haar, "The CBI Was Created asaCatalyst, nota Panacea," Miami Today. Feb. 13.1986.

2
13
350

13

The Congress had soon began its deliberation on the bill. In spite of heavy labor

opposition, the House voted for the initial bill (HR 2769) that would eliminate duties on certain
Caribbean imports. The bill had added certain restrictions to the products that could seek duty

free entry. In the House deliberations, opponents of the bill complained that it would add to

unemployment in the U.S. James Oberstar, D-Minn, one ofthe most outspoken opponents ofthe
bill, spoke for many when he said, "Jobs would be lost in the American workplace and replaced

by subsistence-type jobs in the Caribbean with no health benefits, retirement plans, overtime or
vacation pay...".13

Supporters ofthe proposal said that jobs would be created both in the Caribbean and in
the U.S. They argued that the CBI would work to the favor ofthe U.S. because an improvement
in the economies ofthese nations would push U.S. exports to the region even higher than the $6
billion earned in 1982 from the region.

Many members of the House also argued that the

package would contribute to political stability in an ever-troubled area which was close to home.
Others felt that the promise made to the area had to be fulfilled since the countries were

desperate and would probably turn for assistance from others if the United States failed to
deliver.

In the Senate, aCaribbean Basin Bill (S544) was approved and the full Senate added this
version to HR 2973, the tax withholding bill under which the House version came under.14 The
House and Senate bill differed in that the Senate bill included a provision to protect the U.S.

Virgin Islands rum industry from Caribbean competition. The Congress did accept the idea of
the Free Trade Area, but decided to make it less free by restricting access for several products:

petroleum and petroleum products, canned tuna, footwear, certain leather products, luggage, and
handbags. The original proposal had already exempted sugar and textiles from duty-free
treatment. The proposed investment tax credit of 10% was also deleted and replaced by a
narrower provision allowing businesses and individuals to deduct from their income taxes
13 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1983).
14 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1983).
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expenses for conventions held in Caribbean Basin countries. This was to be contingent upon the

beneficiary country agreeing to disclose information of interest to the IRS through signing of a
Tax and Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA).

On July 28, 1983, both Houses approved the bill, and on August 5, 1983, President

Reagan signed into law Title II of Public Law 98-67, entitled the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA) which is generally known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Subtitle A

of the Actauthorized the President to "proclaim duty-free treatment for all eligible articles from

any country proclaimed by the President to be abeneficiary country for purposes of the Act."15
In order for a Caribbean country to receive the benefits of the CBI, it must be officially

designated as a beneficiary country (BC) under the Act by the President. On November 30,
1983, the President signed Presidential Proclamation 5133 widely referred to as the Free Trade

Area, providing for the promulgation of the duty-free treatment on all eligible articles and
designating certain countries as beneficiary countries to become effective January 1984.
In essence, the legislation was applicable to all of the Caribbean (27 countries), except

Cuba, but was contingent upon each country meeting certain criteria. There are 11 such
discretionary criteria which are for the most part political in nature. They include the degree to

which the country recognizes and upholds basic principles of international trade, protection of
private and intellectual property and the right of collective bargaining by workers. A country

may not be a BC if it has a communist government. The President also has the right to waive
some of these conditions for reasons of national security or economic interests. There are

currently 23 CBI beneficiaries as of November 1991, reduced from 24 with the exclusion of
Haiti due to the political situation there.

Provisions of the CBI16

1. Duty-free access to U.S. market.
15 Public Law98-67,Title II -CBERA.
16 19 USC 2702.
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Caribbean products will have duty-free entry into the U.S. for 12 years. The termination
date was set for September 30,1995. This section is known as the creation of a Free Trade Area
(FTA) in the Caribbean. Before the CBI, 87% of Caribbean exports were already duty-free

under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Except for certain excluded articles, duty
free treatment under the CBI applies to all products which are the growth, product or

manufacture of a beneficiary country (or be "substantially transformed" into a different article of
commerce) and which meet the following criteria:

a. The product mustbe imported directly from the beneficiary country into
the customs territory of the U.S.

b. Its cost or value must consist of at least 35% direct cost of processing

(made of labor or materials) originating in the CBI countries. U.S. raw

material may make up 15% of the35%, so in this case a 20% value-added,
providing a "substantial transformation" is made. The Virgin Islands and
Puerto Rico may be included in the calculation of the local value-added.
Excluded are: textiles and garments (which are subject to bilateral textile
agreements such asthe Multi-Fiber Arrangement), footwear, handbags, luggage and

leather wearing apparel not designated as eligible articles under the GSP under Title V of
thethe Trade Act of 1974, petroleum and its derivatives, canned tuna, and watches and
watch parts (due tothe Most Favored Nation principle in the GATT). In order toqualify
for duty-free treatment of sugar and beef,a country must submit an acceptable Food
Production Plan within 90 days of its designation as a BC. The President also has the
right to withdraw this status for any import that threatens U.S. industries.

2. Incentives to U.S. Investment

The main incentives stem from the above FTA cost-benefit advantage that can be

achieved through the CBI. There is also the advantage of writing off business meetings and
conventions in the Caribbean. There are tax advantages, as well as investment insurance through

OPIC for direct U.S. investment to encourage the location of new production sites in the region.

16

In 1986, under the new Tax Laws, a further investment incentive was added to the CBI.

Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts income profits of U.S. companies doing
business in Puerto Rico from U.S. corporate income taxes if the income is deposited in the

Puerto Rican banking system. These funds may be lent at below market rates to finance
development projects in CBI countries.17

3. Increased Military ("Security") Assistance

This consisted of a total of $350 million to be dispersed among "friendly" nations in the

region in order to contain the spread of alleged foreign-backed "Cuban-styled" revolutions. The

more strategically important countries were given the higher proportion of this money. This did
not even come close to the actual need in the region, and was immediately absorbed into debt
repayments.

4. Other Provisions of the CBI

The Administration said that Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands will be developed as the

"transportation hub for the Caribbean region" and that their industries would be safeguarded
against imports from the countries in the free-trade zone.

While the CBI authorizes most products to be eligible for duty-free treatment, articles
imported into the U.S. from the CBI beneficiary country must qualify for these benefits, as was

previously mentioned. This proved to not always be an easy task. The rules of "substantial
transformation" and value-added criteria are rules governing country-of-origin which is

determined by where the article is grown or produced and which helps to determine the rate of
duty. The "substantial transformation" test is used by the U.S. Customs Service to determine
country-of-origin. "Substantial transformation" means that an eligible article must be either

"wholly the growth, product, or manufacture" of a beneficiary country or be "substantially

transformed" in that country into a new article of commerce. If the article is not made entirely
17CBI Business Bulletin. October 1990.
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from materials and processing operations in the CBI countries, then substantial contribution to

the production of the article must have occurred in the beneficiary country. As stated in P.L. 9867, just combining the operations or diluting with water does not materially alter the
characteristics of the article and will not qualify. (See p.5 of Appendix A)

The value-added criteria must not be less than 35% of the appraised value of the product

being imported to the U.S. from a BC. The value-added is the sum of cost or value of the
materials produced in one or more beneficiary countries plus the direct costs of processing
operations performed in one or more of these countries. Combining, packaging, or dilution, even
if the 35% value-added requirement is met, is still not acceptable.

Realistically, the CBI consisted only of the Free Trade Area (FTA), because 1) the $350
million aid package for the area was only aone-year appropriation and 2) the investment credit
section was scrapped. The FTA itself was significantly reduced in value. It was first reduced

by the administration's initial exclusion oftextiles and other products that were already ineligible
for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because ofany ofthese reasons: 1) the value-added
in the CBI country of origin being was too low, or 2) the country was already exporting more
than allowed under the legislation (e.g., sugar export). The FTA was further reduced by
Congress who added more exclusions such as leather handbags, luggage, and footwear.

When the CBI was implemented, 87% of Caribbean exported commodities were already

duty-free or qualified for tariff-free entry under the GSP. According to a 1988 report by the

Group for the Study ofNational and International Development, the CBI in actuality only affects
5% of the exports from the region since many products are either excluded or already covered
under the GSP. Because the CBI overlapped certain already existing programs and favorable tax

treatment for imports from U.S affiliates under Tariff Provision 807, many of the "additional
benefits" of theCBI legislation were redundant. (See Table 2 ).
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Table 2

Caribbean Basin Exports to the United States, 1980:
Percentage Affected by the Free Trade Area

Value

Category

Percentage

($ millions)

Total

Currently duty free

Oil and petroleum3

10,205

100

8,918

87

6,039

59

552

5

2,327

23

1,282

13

Textiles

282

3

GSP exclusion, value added

182

2

GSP exclusion, competitive need
Products eligible for Free Trade Area

349

3

469

5

GSP

Other (coffee, tropical fruits, etc.)
Dutiable

aPetroleum imports were admitted duty free for the first half of 1980
and later were made dutiable.
Source:

They are not included in the Free Trade Area.

U.S. Department of Commerce.

The reasons for the emptiness of the initiative had alot to do with the fact that throughout

its legislation it suffered "watering down". Another reason was its original intent of trying to

accomplish two opposite goals at once. It attempted to ensure proper economical and political
climate for U.S. companies active in the Caribbean Basin, providing them with unrestricted
access to the region's resources. At the same time, it wanted to supply the means to insulate the
domestic market from competition from the Caribbean producers. The purpose was never to

meet the regional needs of these countries. So if regional needs happened to be met, it would
appear that this would be strictly coincidental.
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JAMAICA AND THE CBI

Implementation of the CBI in Jamaica

The CBI was allowed to take effect beginning January, 1984 but actual utilization of the

program would take time. People had to first be informed of the details of the initiative and
support services set up. The United States and the Jamaican governments worked together to set

up agencies that would assist in explaining and implementing the CBI. Customs officers were

put into place and training pamphlets were distributed to all the agencies that would be affected.
Jamaica National Investment Promotions Limited and the Jamaica National Export Corporation

were later combined intoJamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO). JAMPRO was created to

be a "one-stop shop" for exporters and investors, as well as the national and international
business communities. JAMPRO is the government's economic development agency which

provides wide services to exporters and seeks to foster investment. It also provides
administrative services such as the dispersion of Certificates of Origin which are among the
requirements of the CBI, GSP, and the Jamaica/U.S. Textile Agreement.

Jamaica was one of the most avid supporters of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The

Jamaican economy at the time ofthe enactment of the CBI was in trouble. Many saw the CBI as

away out ofthe economic troubles. It was evident that any benefits from the Caribbean Basin
Initiative would be dependent on the Jamaican government's success in setting policies that
would lead businesses to correct certain marketing deficiencies in order to expand exports. In

other words, certain prerequisites had to be met in order to allow the full advantages of the
program.

Jamaica made some important steps toward utilizing the export-led model starting in
1980 when Prime Minister Edward Seaga came into power. These efforts would later serve to

complement the CBI although at the time of the implementation of the CBI these efforts were
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still new and had not achieved their intended goals as yet. In its initial effort to diversify its
exports in view of the uncertain world market for bauxite and alumina, Jamaica adhered to the

Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund beginning in 1981.
It included incentives for producing non-traditional goods and provided a means for reviving the
declining banana and sugar industries.

Agro 21 was an agricultural program launched in 1983 which was designed to stimulate
the use of underutilized and unused land that could be adaptable to advanced agricultural

methods and lead to large-scale production. This combined the promotion of export crops with
import substitution crops.18 Another step was the creation of the National Export/Import Bank
(EximBank) in 1984. Its services include insurance against non-payment by importers and

authorization of lines of credit. It managed an Export Development Fund which was to be used
to provide hardcurrency financing for imports that yield exports.

Jamaica offers opportunities, especially for breaking in new industries, but since the CBI
relied upon private investment, if these opportunities weren't recognized or investors weren't
convinced, then investments would not come in. One reason for this was the lack of trust in the

U.S. government by investors which was a result of the protectionist blocks that sought to limit
even further the already limited provisions of the FTA. An illustration of the difficulties that
face businessmen seeking to use CBI provisions is the case of Tropicana International. Based on

a 1984 U.S. Customs Service ruling that the company's product (processing of Spanish alcohol

for re-export to the U.S.). qualified for duty-free treatment under the CBI. Tropicana completed
construction of ethanol distillation facilities in Kingston in early 1985. The duty-free ruling was

essential to its decision to partake in this project since the normal duty on ethanol imports is 60
cents per gallon. The new expansion was expected to earn a considerable amount of foreign

exchange for Jamaica and eventually help to stimulate the sugar industry by using locally-

*sInternational Marketing Review. 1989.
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produced cane sugar as its main feedstock. Everything appeared to be fine, until protectionist
pressure began to mount in the U.S. This led to legislation which was enacted in the Tax

Reform Act of 1986which amended the CBI by imposing restrictions on the duty-free treatment

of ethanol imports from certain countries.19 By changing the provisions of the CBI duty-free
provisions, the Congress created distrust of the program among businessmen. It jeopardized the
program in general and was interpreted as a show of noncommitment. Businessmen began to

realize the uncertainty behind the CBI's legislation. There was no reason not to think that
Congress wouldn't make changes that would affect the apparel, electronics, or other non-

traditional industries; they proceeded with caution when it came to the Caribbean due to the
anticipated risk and uncertainty.

As the U.S. economy began to improve, however, so did Jamaica's. By 1987 investments
started coming into Jamaica. The provisions of the CBI becamemore familiar to businessmen as

it was promoted more widely. A few investors began to take notice of the advantages (e.g., low

wages) of investing in Jamaica. Many investors opted to locate their businesses in the free trade

zones due to the many incentives it provided. The "936" fund availability introduced in 1986
helped to attract investments and expansions. Total direct investment in Jamaica in 1987 was
$89.7M versus $23.7M and $$13.2M in 1985 and 1986 respectively.-0 The state-owned Air
Jamaica Airlines was able to add new fleets due to such loans. The primary reason for the pick

up in investments, however, may be attributed more to the pick-up of theU.S. economy and less
to the CBI as the countries' economies became more integrated into the U.S. economy.

Initial Assessment of the CBI

The conceptual basis of the CBI was founded in liberal access to U.S. markets through a

one-way free trade area. It was an export-led model and so it sought to overcome national and

19 Research by the Group for the Study of National and International Development. 1988.
20 World Economic Survey. 1990, p. 345.

regional import substituting industrialization by reorienting new investments and productive
factors to producing for export markets outside of the Caribbean region (to the U.S.) The
domestic market was no longer targeted. Manufacturing activities could be set up strictly for the

export market. Export-led models succeed with the cooperation and commitment of the private
sector; reduction of tariff protections (subsidies) and privatization must occur for the model to
work. This would result in the closure of some firms at first due to the full-blown competition

from imports. The results seemed then to be a displacement of traditional exports and more
attention to new types of exports.

When assessing the performance of the initiative, one must focus on the market

objectives of the program: 1) export expansion, 2) export diversification, and 3) economic
development through trade. One must also consider its ability to boost bilateral trade in nontraditional products, reduce unemployment, and promote capital investment in the manufacturing
sector that would be enough to compensate for loss of foreign exchange earnings from traditional

exports. It is also necessary to place rises in total (tariff-free and dutiable) exports from these
nations in the context of changes in U.S. imports from other regions of the world.

The CBI clearly experienced many difficulties. It had to try to work against many
countertrends such as the slow revival of the U.S. economy and disinvestment in the region.

After four years of its existence, many began to realize its failures. Non-tariff barriers such as
quotas hurt the CBI as well (the U.S. was steadily cutting its sugar quotas); lack of infrastructure

development and the shortage oftrained personnel with knowledge of technical and marketing
skills were also a setback.

The CBI underwent ups and downs. It was amended under the 1986 Tax Reform Act
which produced negative effects for the ethanol industry. In 1986, as well, however, a new

reduced-duty program was established for CBI beneficiary countries. This was referred to as
Guaranteed Access Levels (or GALs) which allowed for negotiations between the countries and

the U.S. based on output and estimated expansion to determine access to the American market of
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apparel items assembled in the Caribbean from materials made and cut in the U.S. This brought

the CBI more in line with TariffProvision 807. It was referred to as ttSuper 807" or "807A". In
agriculture, only pineapples and citrus fruits were affected by the Act as the rest were covered
under GSP. Some industries with potential for growth were the cut-flowers industry and the
furniture industry.

Items under the CBI excluded from duty-free treatment wereeither those on which many

economies relied for foreign exchange (e.g., petroleum, sugar ) or products which Caribbean

Basin countries regard as fundamental to any hopeof significantly increasing exports to the U.S.
(e.g., footwear, leather articles).

Export expansion would mean reordering their exports and

factors of production and looking strictly at non-traditional products that could take advantage of
this duty-free opportunity. This, however, was easier said than done and would definitely take
some time. Once the countries and proponents of the initiative realized that the CBI was not a

magic wand, nor did it intend to be, then they also realized that it could be slowly utilized to
great long-term advantages. In the short time since its inception, up until 1988, however, the

biggest utilizers of this export-led model had been the industries set up to assemble clothing and

electronics initially under the "807" tariff laws. The competitive advantage of these are low
labor costs, and subsidies within the free zones. The most obvious beneficiaries of the initial

CBI trade provisions, however, were producers exporting to the region, not the designated
economies themselves.

In order for the countries to benefit, the CBI had to overcome the harm done to

Caribbean private sector by the global recession and high interest rates. This was an uphill battle
for while imports from the region were shrinking, the U.S. increased commodity sales to CBI
countries. This was found to be true in all of the International Trade Commission reports done

on the impact of the CBI on the U.S. (The reports were a requirement in the legislation due to
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the concerns of labor unions and protectionist groups.) Trade statistics show that for the first two

years of the CBI a 23.1 % decline in U.S. imports from beneficiary countries.21
Jamaica suffered a decrease due to world price declines in bauxite and alumina, which
had been the primary foreign exchange earner in Jamaica since the 1940s. This decrease in
exports was also due to the Manley government tax levies of the bauxite industry in the late

1970s, which forced a few of the mining MNCs out of Jamaica. It was also due to the fact that
the U.S. shifted to Australia for the majority of its bauxite supply.

According to a U.S. Agency for International Development Report, 1) non-traditional,
products were booming, 2) export production had sharply diversified, and 3) U.S. sugar policy
and poor world prices for traditional commodities had offset non-traditional growth. For sugar

bauxite exports, however, it was acknowledged in the report that the reason for the decline was a
direct result of the declining U.S. quotas.

In real value-added terms, "the CBI countries losi

more from U.S. sugar quotas during 1983-1988 than they gained from the growth in non-

traditional exports. The conclusion of that report was that "the CBI can dramatically improve the

economic growth potential for Basin countries that take the necessary complementary action."22
Even with all the effort put forth, things proved disappointing for Jamaica as capital
inflows to the island were initially minimal. Jamaica was still lacking the many prerequisites
that would require hard currency to correct. These included such things as a competitive foreign

exchange, developed physical infrastructure and marketing associations. The underdeveloped
state of the export industries resulted in an overall lack of surplus production capacity. It was

dubious whether the private sector could solve most of these problems. The huge external debt
just helped to weigh the problems down even more.

The CBI benefits, then, proved disappointing for Jamaica. In the first two years of the
CBI, Jamaica's exports declined due to price declines in bauxite and alumina, its principal export
-1 U.S. Department ofCommerce. National Trade Data Bank (NTDB).
22 James Fox. US- AID Report (March 1989). (emphasis added)
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products. This was in part due to external conditions caused by the recession. The relative

strength of the U.S. dollar and the depressed state of commodity prices and U.S. commodity

imports workedagainst Jamaica's progress. According to reports by the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 1986 exports from Jamaica to the U.S. totaled $192.8 million versus imports from
the U.S. to Jamaica of $320.9 million. The economy began to improve in 1987 and continued
into 1988; this was due to an upturn in the general world economy. The hurricane that swept

Jamaica in 1988 served as a major setback, as much of the infrastructure was damaged. This did,

however, have a positive effect as it sent a lot of aid coming in Jamaica's way and resulted in a
renewed interest in the Caribbean region.

There were many limits of the CBI. Nothing in the CBI addressed the problem of low
and unstable prices for commodities such as sugar, bananas and bauxite, which was the main

cause of balance of payments problems. Also, the factories that were set up under the CBI would
employ cheap labor but would have no other links to the Jamaican economy. They would not
use local raw materials nor develop local skills.

CBI II- 1989 TO THE PRESENT

Provisions of CBI II

There began to be widespread criticism of the CBI program, but no legislative
amendment was attempted until late in 1987 with the Gibbons Bill which was set aside due to its

unpopularity. The bill sought to extend the Free Trade Area beyond the September 30, 1995
expiration date. It also sought to liberalize the rules for imports and to add more tariff-free
products.

After going through months of debate, the proposal to increase sugar quotas and to ease

the entry of rubber-soled footwear from Caribbean assembly plants was also denied, and the

26

ethanol issue was argued and reargued. Late in 1989, Rep. Gibbons won a temporary reprieve
from the 1986 change regarding ethanol. The deal allowed the Caribbean plants duty-free

treatment with no local feedstock requirement for 7% of the U.S. ethanol market (or 60 million
gallons) if as much as 35% (as per CBI rule) of the product's value had been added in the
Caribbean. The next 35 million gallons of ethanol would require 30% local Caribbean feedstock
and the Caribbean value-added threshold for additional amounts was 50%. This arrangement

was to last until December 31, 1991, but Gibbons' original bill would have made this

arrangement permanent.23 There were also disputes regarding the reduction in tariffs of leather
goods.

Finally, on August 20, 1990 President Bush signed into law the Customs and Trade Act
of 1990, which included the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990 (CBI

II). The measures were in part an out-growth of President Bush's November 1989 memorandum
calling for an inter-agency effort to improve the implementation of the CBI which was a

response to criticism of the program. The proposals focused on "improvements in the areas of
trade, investment, tourism, promotion, marketing, outreach, technical assistance, and

coordination ...while it appears that some of these measures will be useful because they focus on
specific problems, they are still somewhat vague."24

The most important provision of CBI II was the permanent extension of the duty-free
treatment (Section 211 of the conference amendment) that most goods produced in the region

receive upon entry into the U.S. market, thus eliminating the 1995 expiration date. Although the

bill did notreally expand the list of eligible products, it did provide more support for theoriginal
program as outlined below. Some aspects of the amendment that made up the main provisions
of the CBI II bill were:

23 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1990). p.216.
24 Enhancements tothe CBI. pamphlet provided by JAMPRO.
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1. Section 212- Treatment of Product Exemptions.
/

This provided for duty reduction for certain leather-related products. It called for
a 20% reduction in tariff rates on leather goods(butno! leather footwear)

imported from CBI BCs not to exceed 2.5 percentage points.25 This would be phased in
over 5 years, beginning January 1,1992. This provision applied to goods that were not
eligible for duty-free treatment under GSP (and thereby were formerly ineligible under
the original CBI program as well). This would benefit Jamaica by attracting investment
and encouraging market expansion. According toJAMPRO, at the time of the
amendment Jamaica did not havesignificant exports of leather products.

2. Section 222- Duty-freetreatment for articles assembled in CBI
countries from components produced in the United States.

This was actually an amendment tothe Harmonized Tariff Schedule 9802.804 which
affected CBI countries. This was also the most important new measure in the CBI II. Its

purpose was toincrease duty-free access tothe US market. It provided for duty and
quota-free entry into the United States for any articles (other than textiles, apparel,
petroleum and certain petroleum products) that are assembled wholly from U.S.
fabricated components orprocessed wholly from U.S. ingredients in aCBI
beneficiary country. If these provisions are met, then the imported product will not be
treated as a foreign article and will not be subject to duty. This will thus expand the type
of operations that can beperformed since Customs will no longer need toconsider
whether the processing "substantially transformed" the U.S. inputs to create a

"product of the CBI country. This section also eliminates the 35% value-added criteria
of the CBI. The wording in this amendment is important. By including "processing"
as well as assembly, the new provision eliminates adifficulty for those involved in 806type assembly operations.

This provision has also created controversy and is constantly being attacked by U.S.
protectionists. The U.S. Customs Service requires that exporters get a ruling before importing
most footwear. There was such a ruling on November 5, 1990 by the Commercial Rulings
Division of the U.S. Customs Service that made footwear made in the Caribbean duty-free.26
2519 use 3007.

26 New York Attorney Zelman's Request for Ruling under U.S. Note 2(b) ofthe Harmonized Tariff Schedule ofthe
U.S. regarding certain footwear produced in the Dominican Republic.

Even so, the issue has not yet been settledas the U.S. Congress on many occasions have tried to

say that the extension of duty-free provisions to footwear was an error in wording in the CBI II,

"the effects of which could have a negative impact on the U.S. domestic footwear industry"27 .
Debate on this issue is sure to resurface.

3. Section 223- Rules of Origin for CBI beneficiary products.

This section gives the President the authority to effect changes in the CBI rules of
origin contained in Section 213 of the CBERA.

4. Section 224- separate cumulation for CBI countries under U.S. Anti
dumping (AD) and Countervailing Duty (CVD) laws.

If imports from a CBI country are under investigation in an AD or CVD case, the
imports from that country will no longer be aggregated with imports from non-CBI
countries when determining whetherthe imports from the country are causing or
threatening material injury to a U.S. industry. This was done to prevent the small CBI
BCs from being put together with larger countries in International Trade Commission AD
or CVD investigations sincetheir size usually meant that when taken alonethey could not
put a serious dent in a U.S. industry.

5. Section 225- Ethyl Alcohol

The 1989 Gibbons deal was expanded through December 31,1992. This provision
granted duty-free treatment for ethanol that was only dehydrated within a CBI country if
it met certain annual criteria: no country-of-origin feedstock requirement on the first 60
million gallons (or 7% of the U.S. ethanol market), 30% feedstock requirement on the
next 35 millionand 50% requirement for any additional U.S. imports. This provision

sought to prevent "pass-through" operations (largely using European wine alcohol).28
Ethyl alcohol that wasproduced by a process of full fermentation in a beneficiary country
remained eligible for duty-free treatment in unlimited quantities withoutregard to
27 Wording in Amendment Bill s3204 introduced inCongress onOctober 15,1990.
28 CBI Business Bulletin. October, 1990.
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feedstock requirements. Both methods (full fermentation and dehydration) are used
inJamaica. The Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica has two subsidiaries involved in
ethanol production, Petronol Ltd. and Petrojam Ethanol Ltd. Thelatter is involved in
full fermentation while the former is involved in dehydration. The fact that Petrojam
gets its wine alcohol from the EEC is very important to its production capability because
it is much cheaper than the local cost This makes it uneconomical for the company to

use only local feedstock. They do, however, plan to use a combination of the EEC wine
alcohol and local wet alcohol in order to use this provision to enter the U.S. market duty

free (by satisfying the local feedstock requirement). (JAMPRO)
6. Section 226- Conforming GSP to CBI rules-of-origin requirement.

This makes the GSP more stringent and may indirectly make CBI-produced goods more
competitive as it may wipe out some goods in non-CBI countries that do not meet these
rules-of-origin requirements.

7. Section 227- Requirement for investment of 936 Funds in Caribbean Basin
countries.

This section formalizes the commitment in Section 936 (1986 revision) of the Internal

Revenue Code which exempts profits of U.S. companies doing business in Puerto Rico
from corporate income taxes thatare deposited in the Puerto Rican banking system.
These funds are used for low-interest funds for development projects in qualifying CBI
countries. This provision requires thegovernment of Puerto Rico toensure that at least
$100 million in new investments under936 be madeavailableeach year in eligible BCs.
(See Appendix B for a full summary of the amendments)

Because again, as in the first legislation, protectionist interests prevailed, much was

deleted from the original Gibbons bill. It appeared that CBI II would just be the sequel to an
already watered-down program.

There were other previous changes to the CBI. One was the addition of Section
9802.00.8010 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (US-HTS), known as Guaranteed Access

Levels (GALs) in 1986 was animprovement to the CBI (1986). It affected apparel articles only

and required the apparel to be assembled from U.S. formed and cut textiles. It provided for

Comparison of CBI and GSP Programs

Eligible Countries

Caribbean Basin Initiative

Generalized System of Preferences

Central America and most of the Caribbean

Most developing countries and some Eastern
European countries

countries

Duration of program
and product eligibility

Permanent program with fixed product
eligibility

Programstatute to be considered for renewal
in 1993. Producteligibility adoptedon
product-specific basis through annual review
procedure

Products exempt from
duty-free status

Most textile and apparel, petroleum,
footwear, gloves, leather products, and

Import sensitive products includingcertain
textile and apparel, watches, electronics,
steel, footwear, luggage, learner goods, and
semi-manufactured glass product

watches

Rules of origin require

35% value-added (the value of U.S. materi

35% value-added

ments

als may be counted but only up to 15% of
the appraisedvalue of the imported article)

and

substantial transformation

and
substantial transformation or double
substantial transformation

Value added and substantial transformation

Exceptions from rules
of origin requirements

None

requirements do not have to be met if the
product is made of 100% U.S. components
or if a product of Puerto Rico is further
processed or advanced in a CBI country
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HarmonizedTariff Schedule of the U.S. 9802.00.80:

Provisions for Off-shore Assembly
HTS 9802.00.8010

HTS 9802.00.8040

Description

Guaranteed Access Level (GAL)

(Section 222 of CBI If)

FormerlyTSUS 807

Eligible

CBI beneficiaries

CBI beneficiaries

Any

Apparel

Any product except
textile and apparel
(subject to textile
agreement and petroleum
or any product derived
from petroleum

Any product

HTS 9802.00.8060

100% U.S. Components

Countries

Eligible
Products

Qualification
Criteria Beyond
General
Criteria for HTS
9802.00.80

• Apparel must be assembled
from U.S.-formed and cut
textiles

• U.S. exporter of qualifying
fabric must also import finished

Article must be pro
cessed, assembled or
manufactured from

100% U.S. components

Assembly may include
sewing, gluing, forcefitting, laminaung,•crimp
ing, screwing, nailing,
riveting, soldering, welding
or the use of fasteners.

article

•Operations incidental to the

• Foreign origin findings and
trimmings (i.e. thread, buttons,
lace trim) may be used provided
they do not exceed 25% of total

assembly process (i.e.
cleaning, removing rust or
grease,applying preserva

tion paint, testing, folding)

component costs

are also allowed.

U.S. Market
Access Advan

tage

Virtually quota-free access to the
U.S. market if exported from a
CBI country that has negotiated a
GAL agreement with the U.S. for
the specific article. Duty is levied
only on value added abroad, not
on U.S. formed and cut textiles.

w

Duty-free access

Duty is not assessed on the
valueof exportedand
reimported U.S. components
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quota-free access to the U.S. market if exported from a CBI country that had negotiated a GAL
agreement with the U.S. for the specific article. Duty is levied only on value-added abroad, not
the U.S. formed and cut textiles. The U.S. exporter of the qualifying fabric must also import the
finished article to the U.S.29 (See following two charts). Jamaica is active in this program.
Due to criticism of the CBI and President's Bush's desire to woe Caribbean leaders to his

Enterprise of the Americas Initiative, some more benefits were extended to the CBI countries
effective October 2, 1991. These changes eliminated the conditions that covered such products

as meat, wristwatches, and athletic equipment and restricted them under the original CBI
program.

CBI I and II AND JAMAICA: 1989 TO THE PRESENT

Effect of the CBI on Specific Industries

Jamaica is today the fourth largest exporter to the U.S. in the Caribbean. In 1990, about
30% of its exports (US$335 M) went to the U.S. Half of that entered duty free, in part due to the
CBI.30

Textiles/Apparel

The textile industry is the fastest growing industry in Jamaica. The Export Processing
Zones that have been put into place by the government are made up primarily of firms exporting

textiles and apparel. Its rapid growth began in the early 1980s. In 1983, exports of wearing

apparel were US$12.7M. In 1984, the first year ofthe CBI, it increased to US$32.6M in spite of
the faltering world economy. In 1987, itreached US$102.7M (See Table 3). This growth isnot

necessarily attributed to the CBI program alone. It has been facilitated primarily by the 806
(formerly 807) provision of the US-HTS as well as the GAL provision for CBI countries.
-9 Caribbean Basin Exporters Guide. Dept. of Commerce.
30 1991 United States Annual Report. USITC.

Its

Table

3

JAMAICA

NON-TRADITIOHAL DOMESTIC EXPORTS

US$ Million

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1980

7.2

17.4

12.7

32.6

36.0

52.5

102.6

7.1

19.8

21.8

28.4

21.1

29.5

32.7

41.8

23.1

1.

Wearing Apparel

2.

Fruits and Vegetables

9.2

13.5

9.8

8.3

9.7

8.7

9.5

Cigars

8.5

3.

5.3

7.1

9.1

4.1

3.5

3.4

4.3

Cordials/Liqueurs

7.4

4.

3.0

2.3

2.9

4.6

0.7

1.4

3.5

Beer/Stout

0.8

5.
6.

Cut Flowers/foliage
and other live plants

1.5

1.9

1.1

1.8

3.7

1.6

2.7

1.4

7.8

7.1

'4.5

4.1

4.2

4.7

4.1

Toilet Preparations

4.2

7.

5.2

4.9

2.2

2.2

2.3

B.

4.4

4.6

1.8

Electrical Machinery nes

5.3

6.3

1.8

3.6

3.0

2.2

9."

3.1

3.0

Furniture

S.8

11.5

7.2

6.6

9.3

12.2

7.7

7.8

10.
1 1 .

Miscellaneous Manufactures
Coffee/Cocoa

7.5/5.8
1 .5

12.

Source

: External Trade 1980-1987; The Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
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success is also due to the large amountof skilled persons in the apparel industry in Jamaica and

their increasing emphasis on technical efficiency. The CBI is predicted to have an increasing
impact in the future due to the 1990amendment that gives addedadvantage to these products.

Tourism

Jamaica ranks in the top ten tourist destination in the world and earns over US$700M
from this industry. Tourism is the fastest growing area of investment in the service sector.

It was hoped that the new provisions would help Jamaica become more competitive in
terms of trade. Section 232 was considered important due to its capability of having an impact

on tourism, especially since tourism was a big money earner in Jamaica, and is now Jamaica's
numberone foreign exchange earner. The CBI now provides for the U.S. to make a more serious
commitment in facilitating the increasein the tourism industry.

So far, Jamaica is taking many steps at making this industry work to its advantage. The
government has privatized many of the hotels that were formally state-owned. Most of the
investors are Jamaican citizens (e.g., Sandals and Jamaica Jamaica). Earnings from tourism in
1990 were US$740M. 1991 estimates were lower due to the Gulf crisis, but are expected to pick

up full force in 1992. There is still expected to be tremendous continued growth in this sector.
The CBI will contribute if more investors decide to take advantage of hotel investment

opportunities in Jamaica. Other factors of the CBI do not pertain to this industry as it deals

primarily with goods and not services; thus, the impact hereis still relatively small. There is

also a tradeoff as tourism is a very high import content industry. Again almost 90% of the
imports for this industry, which includes equipment, furniture and food, comes from the U.S.
This offsets its contribution to Jamaica's balance of payments.

Bauxite/Alumina

This industry has a high import content due to the fuel needed for alumina production
which makes it vulnerable to increases in world oil prices. The industry had the best year in
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1990 since itsboom in the late 1970s, which had been followed by a huge decline. The CBI has

resulted in the turnaround from thelate 1970s and early 1980s when theU.S. shifted to Australia
for most of its bauxite. An executive decree in 1986 allowed CBI BCs the same access to U.S.

Government procurement market as domestic producers. This opened opportunities for CBI
subcontractors of bauxite.31

The industry has thus recovered. It grossed over US$730M in 1990. Its revenues
declined in 1991 due to the softening world market for bauxite which resulted in lower
international prices. The U.S. market is also softening.

Although bauxite is the leading industry, it is not the biggest foreign exchange earner

since most of the firms doing bauxite/alumina mining in Jamaica are foreign-owned. Since the

majority of Jamaican bauxite is purchased by the U.S., Jamaican production has often been
affected by U.S. economic trends. The upturn in the U.S. economy in 1992 will definitely have a

positive impact. There is, also, still much profit to be made in bauxite and alumina by utilizing
the CBI.

Agriculture

Jamaica's main agricultural products, sugar and bananas, have been on a general decline

due to poor world market conditions. The banana industry isnot doing as bad as sugar due to its
inclusion in the CBI as well as the fact that there are no protectionist movements in the U.S. for

bananas. It also does well in the European market due to the Lome Convention special

treatment. Sugar production isactually up, but exports are down due to U.S. restrictive quotas.

More sugar is being used in the Jamaican domestic market than ever before. The production of
other export crops have been steady.

There have been dramatic increases in non-traditional agricultural products (such as

flowers) due to shifted trade and industrial policies from import-substitution to export-led

31 Caribbean Basin Exporters Guide. Dept. of Commerce.
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growth. This is almost entirely attributable to the CBI. The banana industry will undoubtedly be
impacted by the Single European market and the fact that banana export quotas with the United
Kingdom will be filled in 1992.

In an effort to deal with these developments, the government

will be privatizing two large estates which together produce over half of all banana exports.

Non-Traditional IVoducts

Jamaica must now look to non-traditional exports as ways to deal with its balance of
payments problems. Traditional exports such as bananas, sugar and even bauxite have been on a
decline due to world-wide import protectionism and the uncontrollable up and down (but mostly

down) price swings for these commodities on the world market. The CBI has no provisions for
sugar; bauxitefluctuates with worldpricesand bananasare also vulnerable to termsof trade.

This had led entrepreneurs to try to market non-traditional export products unique to
Jamaica such as spices, sauces, its high quality cocoa and coffee, and exotic fruits. This

category includes a host of classification of products and is the fastest growing area of exports in
Jamaica. The most popular non-traditionals are fresh food (vegetables, juices and fruits), fresh

fish, coffee (Jamaica boasts one of the best quality coffees in the world-Blue Mountain Coffee)
and cocoa, and spices and sauces. There is almost no limit to the opportunities under the CBI

here as most of these products are afforded duty-free treatment. Wearing apparel is also
considered non-traditional although it is fast becoming a traditional sector. (See Table 3) The
question is whether non-traditionals will make up for the loss in traditional exports. In this
sense, it is a trade-off.

In 1986and 1987 non-traditional exports totaled $162.4 and $224.8 million respectively.
In 1990, non-traditionals decreased from the 1989 amount of US$240M due to the weakness of
the U.S. apparel market in 1990. Diversified non-traditional agriculture export crops are
expected to boom.
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Jamaica Economic Summary

In 1990 and 1991, the Jamaican economy continued to grow but ata very slow pace. The
main force for growth came from expansion in the tourism industry, rehabilitation of export

agriculture, and continued recovery of bauxite/alumina and the service sectors.32 Inflation was at
an all-time high of over 30%. This was primarily due to speculation of the Jamaican dollar and
bad monetary policy of the Jamaican government.

The government's policy toward trade has continued to focus on export expansion,
diversification, and reduction of the growth rate of imports. Despite this, there was a high

increase in imports by the end of 1990 due to the increase in the oil bill due to the Persian Gulf
crisis. In 1990, growth in exports was influencedby increased earnings from traditional exports,
mainly alumina, sugar, bananas and citrus.33 Non-traditionals were less impressive.

Despite its desperate need for foreign exchange, the government has not imposed new

trade restrictions, but is instead leaving the way open for creative importers to come up with
ways to solve their foreign payment problems (through use of the forward markets, etc.). In
September 1990, the Jamaican dollar (JD) was allowed to float in the commercial market. (See
Appendix D) In September 1991, there was further liberalization of the foreign exchange
market. This move would allow market forces to determine the rate of the Jamaican dollar

against other major currencies. It allows buyers and sellers to transact in any agreed upon
currency. It also allows companies and persons, including Jamaican citizens, to keep accounts

overseas. This is significant as it is hoped that this action will lead to a stabilized rate which
would mean more certainty and less risk for both importers and exporters. This was the last
phase in the stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

Even with these adjustments, Jamaica remains plagued with some very central problems.

Inflation has been steadily increasing and unemployment has remained high although it declined
for a brief moment in 1990. The external debt is another major problem; it amounted to

32 Jamaica Economic Overview. 1990 and 1991 (through 3rd quarter); provided by JAMPRO.
33 Ibid.
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US$4.IB in 1990. The debt has been hard to deal with because the majority of it is bilateral and
multilateral debt which is eliminated from considerations of rescheduling. Only 8% of the
external debt is commercial.

The exchange rate is another area for concern. The exchange rate in Jamaica has been

going out of control (See Appendix D). The lack of foreign exchange that this produces
embodies all of the previous problems. The on-going depreciation of the JD was cited by the

U.S. Embassy in Jamaica as the single greatest barrier to U.S. imports, which ironically is an

economic measure mandated by the IMF agreement as a way to increase exports. The truth,
however, is that just because it is supposed to decrease imports does not mean it will increase
exports and in fact the opposite is happening. It does appear that things are improving as the JD

for the first time took a reversal in April of 1992 and appears to be finally stabilizing, albeit, at a
very low value yet. Jamaica needs to earn foreign exchange in order to reduce its debt burdens,

service its loans, and pay for imports. Economic expansion will continue to be limited by
balance of payments pressuresand the heavy debt service burden.
Principal Problems

INFLATION:

1990- 29.8%

UNEMPLOYMENT:

1989- 18.2%

1991- 30.0%

1990- 15.3%
1991-

FOREIGN DEBT
% of GDP

18.0%

EXCHANGE RATE

Debt. Service as %

of Govt's Budget
1988:

US$1=

JD5.50

JD5.95

1980

57%

26%

1990: US$1=

1987
1990

139%
105%

40%
30%

JULY 1991: US$1=
DECEMBER 1991: US$1=
FEBRUARY 1992:
APRIL 1992:

US$1=
US$1=

JD10.21
JD20.00
JD27.00
JD22.00
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It still remains that the Jamaican economy is geared to the world price and demand for
bauxite/alumina, tourism and the world price of oil. Any U.S. recession is bound to affect the
bauxite price; any criminal incident or U.S. recession will affect the tourism industry. This was
evident over the last year and a half with the Gulf Crisis and the U.S. recession. Because of the

open, trade-dependent economy, its future will continue to depend on its ability to export in the
face of international conditions over which it has relatively little control.

The continued focus is on non-traditional exports which are still in their early stages of
the product life cycle. To be successful, these products must have certain attributes such as

advantageous pricing, good quality, effective promotion, and efficient distribution. The product
must be able to create awareness, develop acceptance, and satisfy needs and wants. This means

that these exports mustbe consistently superior to competitive products.34
This brings us to a host of other problems that deter Jamaica's exporting potential. There

are ineffective distributive systems; a good one requires one with good grading, packing,
storing, and transportation.

This can be very capital-intensive and requires long-run

commitment, perhaps beyond what the private sector has the ability to do. This requires the help
of the government. It requires Jamaicans to become active marketers, not passive marketers.

Recent Developments

In 1991, Jamaica became the first Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nation to
implement the Common External Tariff (CET) program which all membercountries are soon to
implement. This action has made CARICOM the first customs union in the Western Hemisphere

and will eliminate protective import duties from any CARICOM member nation. This is
intended to "increase intra-regional trade and spark competition among the nations to produce in
higher quantities and qualities."35 Coffee and some other products will be exempt.

34 International Marketing Review . "Strategies for Export Marketing ofNon-traditional Products", (1989), p.58-72.
35 Jamaica Outlook. "Jamaica implements CET,April 1991.
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The "Jamaica Made" mark was also launched by the Jamaica Bureau of Standards in
early 1992. Products which carry this mark are supposed to have at least 45% local-value added
and meet special approval of the Bureau. This label should help to strengthen Jamaica's
international trade and discourage "pass-throughs" and instances where producers mark their
products as a product of Jamaica when there was little or no Jamaican content in the product.

This is just one way that the government is trying to meet international standards and help
improve the marketing of Jamaican products.

Another development is the construction of a new data entry building at the Montego Bay
Free Zone in 1992. This is an indication of the growth in the free zones which helps to create

jobs. (It has, however, not offset the increasing high unemployment due to displacement in other

industries.) State of the artcommunications facilities were brought to the Zone in 1989 with the

creation of Jamaica Digiport; the trend is continuing as the government targeted 18,000 jobs in

the advanced information systems in the communications industry by 1994. It anticipates
foreign exchange earnings of US$200M for the industry by 1994.36

Another development that is bound to affect the Jamaican economy is the North

American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) under President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas
program. The concern of Jamaican leaders deal with how NAFTA will fit into already existing
trade arrangements such as the CBI. The CBI is a legislative program so it canbe chipped away

by protectionist interests in Congress. NAFTA, on the other hand, is a treaty which cannot be
tampered with once accepted.

On March 17, 1992, Jamaican Ambassador Richard Bernal told the ITC that "all apparel

exports from CBI beneficiary countries should be given immediate duty-free status if the North
American free trade agreements provides such status for Mexican apparel exports." He also said
that the CBI program should be placed on a treaty basis so as to insulate it from possible changes

by Congress and apparel products should also be able to enter the U.S. quota-free.37 Currently,
36 "More Data Entry Capacity for Montego Bay," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner. February 10, 1992.
37 The International Trade Reporter. March 18, 1992, vol. 9,p.485.
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thequotas are negotiated based on the Multi-Fiber Agreement and GAL between Jamaica and the
U.S.

The CBI does not provide duty-free treatment for a majority of articles and does not

include totally duty-free status to sensitive imports such as textiles and apparels.
The International Trade Commission was ordered by U.S. Trade Representative Carla

Hills to investigate the potential effects of providing duty-free and quota-free treatment for
apparel from Mexico under NAFTA on CBI countries.38 There was a general study made of the

impact of the Free Trade Area with Mexico on the United States in February of 1991. In that

study, horticultural products, electronic components, and apparel were looked at. The ITC told
the Congress that these sectors, which are also the CBI's largest non-traditional export revenues,

would suffer harm from a free trade agreement with Mexico.39

This finding has already

worked against the Caribbean countries in that many U.S. companies are holding off investment
decisions in other countries, including countries in the Caribbean until the U.S.-Mexico trade

negotiations are over. The Free Trade Zones may also be in jeopardy by NAFTA as "free trade"

would call for gradual elimination of in-bond manufacturing and duty drawbacks.40
The Caribbean nations, with Jamaica at the forefront, are fighting to maintain some of

their privileges. Many are considering bargaining off their debt with the U.S. as a trade-off for
joining such an agreement.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE CBI

The Caribbean Basin Initiative was introduced as a program of aid and assistance. It was

politically designed, and it popularized the method of tying bilateral aid to trade. It was

represented by the Reagan Administration as a program intended to supplement local efforts to

38 Miami Report III- Recommendations for a Nafta and for Future Hemispheric Trade. University of Miami. (1992).
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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Its purpose as stated in its legislation was to facilitate and promote, and not necessarily to
create or achieve these goals. Its purpose as worded in the legislation,was not a vehicle to solve

the problems in the Caribbean. The mistake was in the Administration's overpromotion of this
new program, and dealing in "false advertising."

As an export-led program, the CBl's main focus was on the private sector. There was,

however, no support of the development of infrastructure by the Administration. How could a

program encourage trade and investment without the necessary infrastructure to support it? That
question was, of course, left to the private sector to figure out. There was no attempt to expand

local and regional markets so that the Caribbean nations could reduce their food imports and

supply their own market demands. It can be argued that CARICOM should have forecasted this
and taken action to work on regional programs. This was, however, contrary to the principles of
the CBI.

It is worthwhile to note that the policies behind the CBI differed from policies adapted by

governments ofother more successful late industrializing economies in Asia. These countries
adapted state-directed rather than private sector-led development programs. This model has been
referred to as national developmentalism by James Petras.41 The governments of these nations

(Taiwan and South Korea in particular), became the driving force in establishing significant

prerequisites for export-led growth which came soon after. There was also continued emphasis
on the domestic market and government involvement in agriculture. Another important point is
that the United States channeled much more resources into the development of these nations

physical and social infrastructure which represented structural obstacles to economic
development.42

One would think that the U.S. channeling more resources into development of these

nations would cause dependency and that dependency is what countries should avoid as it deters
41 James Petras, "New Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Classes in the Periphery", Journal ofContemporary
Asia. 5.3 (1975), p. 298. This reference was found inPolitics inJamaica by Anthony Payne, 1988.
42 "The CBI and Its Impact onthe Commonwealth Caribbean in Light of the Puerto Rican Model of ExportOriented Development". Research by the Group for the Study of National and International Development,
1988.
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development. This is debatable and it brings us into the discussion of"dependency theory" itself.
Dependency theory is an approach for explaining underdevelopment and is adescriptive analysis
of development and modernization. South Korea and Costa Rica, again, are interesting cases and
will be mentioned in this discussion.

Dependency theory is an approach that came about in the 1960s that dealt with the
broader and more basic question of the roots of Latin American development. It evolved as a

comprehensive conceptual framework and became the dominant approach in most Latin
American intellectual circles.43 Lawrence Harrison sums up the thinking of dependency theorists

cynically, "Latin America is poor because we are rich. International capitalism has depressed the
prices ofLatin American commodities while charging it outrageous prices for its imports from
the U.S. The U.S. government supports rightist dictators and opposes truly popular movements
to perpetuate its privileged imperialistic position."44

Even Harrison, however, admits to some of the truths of dependency theory simply

because ofthe many facts inherent in it that can not be refuted, such as the consequences of
world prices for Latin America and problems with small economies. Harrison does not deny that
dependency is avery important concept for small economies due to their lack of aprofitable
domestic market and their high import needs.

Dependency theory assumes that the development ofanation can only be understood in
connection with its historical insertion into the worldwide political economic system whose

tendencies began in the 16th century; history and time are very important elements. Dependency

theory deals with structural and macrosociological problems and focuses on modes of
production, terms oftrade, and political and economic links. Inquiry into the global system is its
objective; it suggests that changes would result from realignment of dependency relations over

time. How this realignment is to happen is not stated in dependency theory as it is descriptive
and vague, rather than prescriptive. The solutions are still left to the countries to ponder over
43 Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency," Comparative Politics, July 1978.
44 Harrison, Lawrence E. Underdevelopment isa State of Mind. (Lanham: Madison Books. 1985).
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based on their individual circumstances.

There also remains the question of whether
/

realignment, if it were to happen, would lead to development.

This theory sees dependent development as leading to or at least not erasing
underdevelopment. Dependent development is described as "producing a structure where
personal gain for dominant groups or entrepreneurial efforts are not conducive to the collective
gain of balanced development."45 The cases of South Korea and Costa Rica partly contradict this

statement for they serve as relatively successful examples of dependent development. Costa

Rica, depended mostly on U.S. support, while S. Korea received help from both the U.S. and
Japan. In both cases, they were helped due to their utmost strategic importance (Costa Rica, due
to its border with Nicaragua and S. Korea, due to its threat of leftist politics).

These countries can be studied to extract cluesthat may helpthose countries struggling to
develop today to develop their own models. The reality is that no two situation is the same and

as the dependency theory states, the time context mustbe considered. Dependency theory has its.
truths and revelations but the extent to which one prescribes it must be cautiously looked at. On
the extreme, it may cause developing countries to shift the blame or to become unreproachable

for their mistakes. This will only leave a country complacent and accepting of its feelings of
impotence; this in itself can lead it to a stateof hopeless dependency.

It must be remembered that this theory is descriptive and historical, and therefore does
not prescribe specific action; it only serves as a relative context that could lead to an

understanding of why things are the way they are. The challenge is to come up with series of
action that take these assumptions into consideration. Although the CBI has caused increased

dependency, this dependency if utilized properly may lead to interdependence and selfsufficiency if the countries are willing to take a firm stand on what national strategies to workthe

CBI into. The dependency theory can not rule out the fact that dependency may be conducive to
development. The important thing here seems to be that the countries as in the cases of S. Korea

45 Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency," Comparative Politics. July 1978, p.421.
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and Costa Rica, retain their national autonomy and their governments play a strategic role in the
economy in terms of facilitating its internal infrastructure development.

Instead of supporting state-oriented strategies that could deal with such problems as lack

of transportation and marketing facilities, the Caribbean nations in their desperation succumbed
to bilateral aid which was poured into the poured into providing Export Processing Zones
(EPZs), or free trade zones, which relied on American imports. While the EPZs created some

jobs, they paid extremely low wages and did not make up for the vast unemployment in
traditional industries that had suffered relative declines since 1980.

The fact that theCBI emphasized foreign private investment indicates theintention of the
program to benefit the foreign investors, not the economies. This has led to a reversal of trade
patterns between the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin. Another factor was the pressure to buy

American imports which the CBI provided for and which had led to reliance on the U.S. for
imports, particularly in the tourism and mining sectors. The CBI, thus, supports U.S. exports.

In 1984 exports to the region was $6B and was at a deficit. In 1990, U.S. exports to the
Caribbean was at an all time high of $9.3B with a surplus of $1.8B.46 This is proof that the
Caribbean and Latin American markets have continued to be outlets for U.S. exports.

The CBI is still a relatively new program; it is only eight years old. A proper assessment
of its actual success, then, will be hard to establish. Not only that, but the provisions have

changed many times and havebecomebroadened to even include provisions that were previously

under other programs. Many of the wording in the legislation is so vague that the impact of the
program remains almost unable to quantify. To date, there has not been a comprehensive

governmental study of the overall effect of the CBI on specific Caribbean nations' economies.
There have, however, been studies done by the United States on the effect of the CBI on certain
U.S. industries that the CBI was expected to create competition for. These studies were
mandated in the original legislation.

46 Report by the U.S. Department ofState on the CBI, November 1991.
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According to a recent study in 1990 by the Department of Commerce, there has been an

overall decline in export earnings by CBI countries. The estimate for 1991, even with a pick-up
in the U.S. economy, was still lower than the 1983 amount. (See Table 4) The decline in

petroleum from the oil-producing BCs (from 55% of exports to 20.5%), led to this overall
decrease. Traditional products such as petroleum and sugar were not includedin the CBI. Non-

petroleum imports increased but not enough to offset the decrease in petroleum since the
domestic value-added in traditional exports is generally greater.

In the mid- to late 1980s, the ethanol processing and cut flower industries were

considered "boom" industries but were hurt by protectionist movesin the U.S. The protectionists

soon pressed the ITC to initiate anti-dumping and countervailing duties in Costa Rica due to their
enormous success in the cut flower industry. Events such as these were very discouraging but
even so, these non-traditional industries continued to prosper.

Exports to the U.S. of non-traditional products which were CBI-eligible grew to $2.4B,
with almost $2B of that being textile/apparel, according to Figure 3. The average annual
increase of non-traditionals was 12% between 1983 and 1990.47 The textile/apparel industry is

still booming as total exports of these products to theU.S. have grown 25% per year since 1983.
The cause of this was mainly attributable to "9802" tariff program provisions which also allows

U.S. importers to pay duties only on the value-added abroad. It is expected that the CBI GAL
provision for textiles will continue to accommodate the expected growth in this industry.

It was found that U.S. imports of products eligible for CBI benefits have increased by
250%, growing from $582M in 1983 to $1.5B in 1990. This represents a small fraction of total

exports from the region. Only $422M of the $1.5B in Caribbean Basin imports thatwere entered

under the CBI would have been dutiable but for the duty-free provisions of the act.48 The other
goods were also eligible for other programs such as MFN and GSP and entered under that.

Since many more products not Covered by other programs can receive duty-free status under the
1991 United States Annual Report. International Trade Commission.

48 Latin America/Caribbean Business Bulletin. December, 1991.
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CBI, it appears that its benefits are underutilized. The problem, however, is that there needs to
be marketing contacts set up for these potential productsbefore they can be profitably exported.

The leading five products actually benefitting from the CBI, were found to be pineapples,

frozen concentrated orange juice, rum, raw cane sugar, andethyl alcohol.49 However, the key
Caribbean products, completed footwear and non-U.S. origin textiles and apparels, are excluded
from the CBI.

The overall investment in the region since 1983 was found to be quite low—$1.9 B. The
ITC cited some reasons for this: lack of access to foreign exchange, political and economic
instability, and the recent U.S. recession. It can be said, however, that the CBI has helped the

most by making investors aware of the Caribbean as an "oasis of opportunities." Opportunities

are definitely available for a creative business person and there are funds available (e.g., "936",
OPIC). The problem with the available funds, however, is their difficulty to access. In spite of
such limitations, however, it appears that new avenues, especially for non-traditional export

development, have been created. The important thing that businesspeople seem to keep in mind
is that if it couldn't fly without the CBI, then it probably wouldn't fly with the CBI. The

business venture had to be a sound one, fully researched and found to be viable in order for
benefits to occur. In this sense, the CBI did not make much difference; infrastructure and
viability were more important.

This is not to saythatthe CBI was a futile attempt or that no benefitscan be realized from
it given enough time and ingenuity on the parts of the government of the Caribbean countries.
The CBI can be seen as a way of making the Caribbean more dependent on the U.S., as
prescribed by dependency theorists, but the resemblance should end there. It can also be used to
the advantage of the Caribbean. Jamaica especially stands at a good position to reap the benefits
because of its relatively ample middle class. Necessary changes would not hurt them so much as

the urban lower-class and the poor small farmers. These groups must be "taken care of so they

49 International Trade Reporter. October 23. 1991 (Source: ITC).

45

can at least survive the dry spell that must come while the government implements its strategies.
The prescription would require much effort from the Jamaican government in concert with the
long-suffering Jamaican people; education as to long-term benefits must beemphasized.

The necessary steps of this "strategy" has already began to happen in Jamaica recently.
Technical training and education should bethe backbone of this strategy. The displaced farmers
must be retrained so that they can be productive; they must be trained as to some of the new

agribusiness opportunities that they can be prosperous, and encourage them to stay self-sufficient
in terms of their basic food supplies. Technical training must also be provided for urban youth

and relevant education must begin at an early age. What is,meant by relevant education is one in

which students are taught to be productive and nurturing of their society and not necessarily
based on the education system of Great Britain as it presently is (which makes it somewhat
irrelevant unless one plans to emigrate).

The other important step is development of infrastructure. Farm-to-market roads must be

improved so that delivery time and uncertainty is cut down. Island-wide improvement and
increase of the electric power service is another important factor, since this would lead to more
consistency and increased productivity.

Education and infrastructure development are the two most important factors that must be
improved upon to make Jamaica more self-sufficient. According to dependency theory,
realignment is the only thing that would change Jamaica's dependence on larger world powers
and the international economy. One, however, can not sit around and wait for that to happen.
Dependency of itselfis not a "bad" notion, but it must not become an albatross which one wears

around ones neck, nor an excuse for giving up or making concessions. Dependency is simply a
fact of a situation that exists, and nothing in it says that it cannot lead to mutual satisfaction or
interdependency.
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Summary of Trends: Aid. Trade, and Investment
Aid

In 1983, US$500M in aid went to the Caribbean region; in 1990 US$250M went to the
region, US$67M of which went to Jamaica.
Trade

Trade in 1983 of CBI-eligible non-traditional goods, including textiles and apparel

(although they were not altogether CBI-eligible), was US$128.2M and this amount jumped to

US$421.6M in 1990. According to a Commerce Department survey, between 1984 and 1988,

21,237 export-related jobs were created in Jamaica. This was about 3.7% of total employment.50
Investment

New foreign investment in Jamaica was $7.3M for 1983. As of 1990, Jamaica had
US$517.1M investment income, $152M was U.S. investment in the manufacturing sector.

According to JAMPRO, between 1981 and 1990, 1,222 projects (foreign and local) with total
capital investment of JD$3.54B were started. In that period, 79,600 jobs were created by these

projects. 415 of the projects were assisted through JAMPRO; of that amount, 259 or 62% were
U.S. investments.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The fundamental motivation for interest in the Caribbean was strategic.

The fear that

U.S. adversaries would capitalize on political unrestand regimes hostile to the U.S. emerged as a

driving force behind the policy. A link was created between economic problems and political
trends in the Basin. U.S. economic interests in the Basin, then, were not significant beyond the

50 James Fox, US- AID Report (March 1989).
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role the region plays as an intermediary for flows of oil and capital and as a front for migratory
labor.

In light of these motivations, the intent of the CBI was tobolster the faltering economies
and to link them more closely to the U.S. economy. It was assumed that this would have the

positive result of aiding these countries in their economic development. The conservative
Reagan/Bush ideology assumed that supply-side economics would be the answer in the

Caribbean. They saw no conflict between multinational or foreign investment and economic
development for these countries. This increased the dependence of the Caribbean countries on

the U.S. economy. This was an intended result given the foundation of the CBI. The U.S.
government saw integration of the Caribbean nations into the world economy as consistent with

development even though these countries, as economically weak as they were, would not beable

to compete effectively in the world economy. Their only real strength would come from
integration through the pooling oftheir collective power and resources, but this was discouraged.
The result was that the CBI succeeded in linking these countries with theU.S. which has

helped to reverse the latter's trend toward increased trade deficits with the region. In 1988, the
Caribbean Basin was the only major region with which the U.S. had atrade surplus.51 It has also
lead to more reliance on multinational corporations, especially as more and more industries

became privatized. The direct impact of the CBI on the economic well-being of an individual

country such as Jamaica, however, is hard to specify. This is partly due to the redundancy of the
benefits of the CBI. As stated previously, it duplicated benefits that were already provided

through the GSP, 807, and MFN. The duty-free provision of the CBI had only a minor effect on
the growth in non-traditional exports from the region. According to a Commerce Department

study, it accounted for less than 20% of this growth. Indirect factors such as improved export

promotions efforts, macroeconomic policies, and favorable U.S. treatment of apparel (under

GAL) were more important. In studying the program, one definitely finds indirect effects of

51 U.S. Department ofCommerce.
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the CBI (both negative and positive) which are of equal or even more importance than the direct
intended benefits.

Since the implementation of the CBI, Jamaica has increased its production of

manufactured and agricultural non-traditionals. This is in part due to the CBI since it encourages
production of non-traditionals and since most of the products thatbenefit from the CBI are nontraditional. The critical point is that traditionals which earn more foreign exchange have

decreased and this decrease has not been offset by increases in non-traditionals since nontraditionals are worth less in terms of trade. Unemployment has been helped by the program, but
only minimally. The concentration of new employment is in the Free Trade Zones, as in the case

of Jamaica, with a general shiftaway from agriculture and employment in traditional industries.
The CBI encourages use of foreign imports, especially those of the U.S.

This is

demonstrated through the popular countertrades in which Jamaica trades its products or materials

and in return receives receipts for U.S. supplies or food instead of money. This, in essence, ties
the country to the use of U.S. imports as part of the trade agreement. Food products are
Jamaica's largest imports from the U.S. The CBI also encourages use of foreign imports because

less energy is focused on developing products for local use. The result is that Caribbean nations
are now less self-sufficient in some areas such as food production. The CBI also contained
many of the ideals of the World Bank which meant strict austerity and the elimination of food

subsidieswhich led to a decrease in the qualityof life for most Jamaicans.
These nations have also made available to the U.S. sensitive information through signing

of the Tax and Investment Exchange Agreement which surrenders their independence or
sovereignty to Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. This is a trade-off
which arises the question of whether the CBI can compensate for the losses in their independence
and autonomy.

Another result is that regional institutions such as CARICOM were undermined. The

U.S. has been able to exert more leverage over the internal political affairs of Jamaica because
the President could terminate the free trade area with countries who failed the ideology test. It
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has led these nations to do whatever is necessary to stay in the "good graces" of the U.S. as well
as disassociate with neighboring countries. This has led to criticism within the countries as well

as renewed interest in counter-hegemony approaches. CARICOM remained at a standstill for
several years and it is only recently that it has regained momentum due in part to the activities in
the EEC.

It is now crucial for Jamaica to take a positive leadership role in bringing the Caribbean

Basin to regional harmony through their influence in CARICOM. The Caribbean nations must

work together in order to foster economicindependence and lessen theirreliance on the U.S. and
large foreign-owned corporations for their development. This can be done by diversifying their
markets, trading more among themselves and taking moreactive steps in developing as a region.

This will improve their strength and autonomy in the large global economy, renew their selfconfidence and make less of the Caribbean Basin a concessionary nations of peoples. They have

already started to do this with the implementation of the Common External Tariff.
Another issue is the importance of the countries having the necessary prerequisites such
as developed and dependable infrastructure (communication, transportation, utilities) that were

necessary for the export-led CBI to be fully utilized. The countries in which these prerequisites
were mostly met were also the countries that were able to utilize the CBI the most (e.g., Costa

Rica, Dominican Republic). They were able to take immediate advantage of the benefits of the
CBI. As the structural infrastructure improves, so too does the environment for investments. For

example, the growing trade levels and expansion in 1987 and 1988 called for the need of
technologically advanced telecommunications facilities and services which had been limited in
Jamaica. This led to the development of Jamaica Digiport in 1989 which has sparked more
joint ventures and investment in the communications industry.

The CBI has helped to make the Jamaican government and leaders more active in their
efforts to improve trade. There are still much higher hopes for Jamaica, especially to take

advantage of the new provisions in CBI II. The attitude among local entrepreneurs in Jamaica
will be a factor in the development of the country and its utilization of the CBI. They must take

50

a more active role in marketing new products to new target markets. The Jamaican government
must also take an activerole in this, as well as continue its effort to improve communication and

transportation. It must also work on encouraging the building of the domestic market by

reducing inflation and supporting local business ventures, as well as working out a way to
finance its huge external debt.

In other words, Jamaica must take on a slightly modified approach-one that it has not

tried yet, one which it is perhaps afraid to try due to outside influences (such as that of the U.S.),
but one thatit must try. This approach is similar to thatwhich countries such as South Korea and

Kenya have tried; it is referred to as the "national developmental" model.52 In such a model the
government takes on the role as guide and support. The dependency theory cannot be followed

as a prescriptive approach only a relative background for what is to be done. The Jamaican
government must work out a middle ground so that it can take action where needed when it is

pushed by the private sector and at the same time be certain not to push the private sector. It
must take responsibility for generating economic growth without reverting to controlling the
private sector. Laissez-faire can not work in a weak economic environment such as Jamaica; the

private sector, especially the local businessmen, clearly cannot goit alone.
The "Caribbean Basin Initiative" is used today to describe a broad range of Executive

Branch economic programs and agencies that operate in the Caribbean Basin, including: on

going bilateral and multilateral aidprograms, U.S. Eximbank loans. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) loans and political insurance for U.S. investors, and services of the U.S.

Departments of Commerce and Agriculture that promote trade and investment in the Caribbean
region. In this context, it can be said that the CBI is more than just a single piece of legislation;

it is a broad policy directive which is constantly evolving and consists of various governmental
programs intending to focus more attention and resources on the region.

52 Pl

Payne, Anthony, Politics in Jamaica. (1988), p.10.
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In summary, the CBI's main impact has been to: 1) reduce regional unity in the Basin, 2)
facilitate a reliance on the U.S., 3) facilitate the displacement of the economies (in terms of the
emphasis on lower-value added non-traditionals), and 4) reduce the U.S. deficit with the region.

The mainly positive things it has accomplished are to make people aware of opportunities in the

Caribbean, increase the export of non-traditionals (offset, of course, by the damage to the

traditionals primarily caused by U.S. quotas), and make Caribbean "peoples" become mindful of
their abundance of resources. The negative effects of the CBI as well as U.S. policy towards the

Caribbean have been partly responsible for the resurgence of regionalism in the Caribbean.

In conclusion, theexport-led tool of theCBI to date has had onlyarelatively small effect
on Jamaica's trade. This is in part due to the fact that the CBI never dealt with the true issues

which have been keeping Jamaica from being competitive, as well as the fact that this model

cannot work by itself. In spite of its shortfalls, the CBI is still the most far-reaching program of
its type; together with the GSP and the 807 program, there are still opportunities to be gained
from its utilization.

The fact remains, however, that the CBI needs certain requirements and urgings of the

government which it does not provide for. In essence, it is up to the Jamaican government to

find a way to achieve the requirements necessary to benefit fully from the CBI. To fulfill these

requirements, however, may necessitate coming in conflict with some of the precepts of the
legislation. As this is yet to occur, the true impact of the CBI is still to be realized for Jamaica.
The longer run impact of the CBI as an export-led tool in Jamaica may be more significant,

depending crucially still on the performance of the U.S. economy and the Caribbean Basin
nations' domestic and regional economic policies.
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WHAT OTHERS HAVE SAID

1.

Raymond Jerguson
Economics Officer- CBI

U.S. Dept. of State
202-647-2066

5/5/92

OPINION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CBI:

- Hard to quantify

- Large amountof trade would go on without the special treatment

- Jamaica definitely benefits from protectionist trade policy with the U.S.
- Quotas- distorts trade but also protects exporters

2.

Rodrigo Sodo
Desk Manager- Caribbean
Dept. of Commerce
202-377-2527
5/5/92

"Unfortunately, the CBI only includes man-made upper footwears. When utilized with
the Free Trade Zones, it givescountries foreign exchange. The companies must
purchase somelocal supplies and utilities like electricity."
"The countries must make concessions to attract and accommodate people."
3.

Mary Keenan,
International Trade Admin.

Grand Rapids
616-456-2411

5/1/92
RE: CBI

"...limited success...Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico (their banks) did well.
But too many restrictions...(it) haslimited effect."
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PROVISIONS

[Eligibility. Stipulated that the bill's provisions were applicable to the 27 nations in Central America
and the Caribbean as well as Guyana and Surinam but not Cuba. A nation would be eligible for benefits
if it:

- Was not a communist country.

- Hadnot nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seizedownership of U.S. property, and had not
repudiated contracts, patents, or trademarks of U.S. citizens.

- Had not failed to act in good faith on the results of binding arbitration in favor of U.S. citizens.

- Did not provide preferential tradetreatment to the productsof countries other than the U.S, to the
detriment of U.S. commerce.

- Hadnot broadcast U.S. copyrighted material without the consent of the owners.
- Cooperated with the U.S. to preventdrug traffic.
- Had signed an extradition agreement with the U.S.

Beneficiary countries wishing to export beef and sugar to the U.S. must also implement "stable

food production plans" toensure that land needed to provide food for the nation's citizens was notdiverted
to export crops.

Beneficiary nations were to be designated by the president after notification to Congress. A
decision to terminate Ixmericiary statusrequired 60 days notice to Congress.

Benefits.

Provided duty-free entry into the U.S. market for 12 years for Caribbean products except:

textiles and apparel, petroleum products, footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods (wallets, eyeglass cases,

etc.), work gloves, leather wearing apparel, tuna, and watches or watch parts. Sugar would be duty-free,
but subject to quotas.

- Stipulated that products eligible forduty-free status must be imported directly from a beneficiary'
country. At least 35% of the products value must consist of Caribbean parts and labor, but U.S. parts and

labor could account for up to 15fc of that 359c. Items that were not the product of BC and were simply
combined, packaged, or diluted in theCaribbean would not be eligible.
- Allowed U.S. citizens to take the same tax deduction for conventions held in eligible Caribbean

nations as allowed for U.S. conventions, provided the nation had entered intoa tax treaty with the Uniteu
States. That provision was expected to cost the government about S5 million in lost revenue per year.

Puerto Rico. Virgin Islands. Included provisions to compensate PR and the VI for the increased
competition they would face in the U.S. market from Caribbean competition.

Reports.

Required the U.S. International Trade Commission to prepare penodic reports on the impact

of the Caribbean Basin Initiative on U.S. industries and consumers, and required the Labor Department to
undertake a continuing review of the bill' s impact on U.S. employment.

APPENDIX B

CBI

I.

II

SUMMARY

Amendments to Original CBI Legislation:

Sect.

211 - Repeal of termination date of CBI program.

Sect.

212 - Duty reduction for certain leather-related products.

Sect.

213 - Workers rights criteria harmonized with GSP standards.

Sect.

214 - Presidential reporting to Congress on operation of CBI.

Sect.

215 - Treatment of articles produced in Puerto Rico.

Sect.

216 - Sense of Congress to improve CBI utilization.

II.

Amendments to the Harmonized Tariff

Schedule and Other

Provisions Affecting CBI countries:
Sect.

221 - Increase of duty free tourist allowances.

Sect.

222 - Duty-free treatment for articles assembled in
beneficiary countries from components produced in the

Sect.

223 - Rules of origin for products of beneficiary countries.

Sect.

224 - Separate cumulation of beneficiary country products
under countervailing and antidumping laws.

Sect.

225 - Ethyl alcohol provision.

Sect.

226 - Confirming CBI rules of origin to GSP program.

Sect.

227 - Requirement for investment of section 936 funds.

United

III.

Sect.

States.

Scholarship Assistance and Tourism Promotion:

231 - Establishment of private and public sector scholarship
program.

Sect.

232 - Sense of Congress on efforts to promote tourism
development.

Sect.
IV.

233 - Pilot Customs preclearance program.
Miscellaneous Provisions:

Sect.

241 - Trade benefits for Nicaragua.

Sect.

242 - Sense of Congress on agricultural infrastructure
support.

Sect.

243 - Sense of Congress on extension of trade benefits
to the Andean region.
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(2)

(1)

Se<

6049(a) with respect to more than 50 payees for any calen
dar year, all returns under such sections shall be on mag
netic media.
. ... t „
,
"(B) Hardship exception—Subparagraph (A) shall not

apply to any person for any period if such person estab

lishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that its applica
tion to such person for such period would result in undue
hardship."

.oil

(b) Study ok Wage Returns on Magnetic Tape —
(1) Study—The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation

with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall con-

,011

mi

4151.

duct a study of the feasibility of requiring persons to file, on
magnetic media, returns under section 6011 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 containing information described in sec
tion 6051(a) of such Code (relating to W-2s).

(2) Report to coNGRESS.-Not later than July 1. 1984, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on

Ways and Means of the"" House of Represent^ives and the

Committee on Finance of the Senate the results of the study
conducted under paragraph (1).
!l note

by section 102 shall take

TITLE II-CAR1BBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

v Act.

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

-

This title may be cited as the "Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-

ery Act".

ins

ition.

iiion of

has notified the House of Representatives and the Senate and has
notified such country of his intention to terminate such designation,
together with the considerations entering into such decision.
ib) In designating countries as "beneficiary countries" under this
tale the President shall consider only the following countries and
territories or successor political entities:
An^'uilla

Nicaragua

hahanias. The

Panama
Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago
Cayman Islands
Montserrat

1.1 Salvador
l.rrnada
(iujtemala

Saint Christopher-Nevis

(iuyana

Turks and Caicos Islands

Haiti
Honduras

Virgin Islands, British

Netherlands Antilles

In addition, the President shall not designate any country a benefici
ary country under this title—
(1) if such country is a Communist country;
(2) if such country—

(A) has nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized
ownership or control of property owned by a United States
citizen or by a corporation, partnership, or association

which is 50 per centum or more beneficially owned by
(B) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify—

(i) any existing contract or agreement with, or
(ii) any patent, trademark, or other intellectual prop

erty of,
a United States citizen or a corporation, partnership, or

SEC III. AUTHORITY TO GRANT DUTY-FREE TREATMENT.

association which is 50 per centum or more beneficially
owned by United States citizens, the effect of which is to
nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or

sions of this title.
SEC 212 BENEFICIARY COUNTRY.

(aXl) For Purposes of this title—

control of property so owned, or

country listed

(A) The term "beneficiary country ™ans any to

j

-i=r
wmcs
beneficiary country
for purposesJygaSSSa
«f^^*SSwfc^5

Eligible
countries

Jamaica

Ahiixua and Barbuda

United States citizens,

Subtitle A—Duty-Free Treatment

TVrmin.if
nutilkati

Congress

designation) unless, at least sixty days before such termination, he

llominican Republic

(a) General RuLE.-Except as ^i^i*|i^^j^!^,0£

it

2702

i2i If Ihe President has designated any country as a beneficiary
iuuntry lor purposes of this title, he shall not terminate such
designation (either by issuing a proclamation for that purpose or by
iviuing a proclamation which has the effect of terminating such

the amendments made by this title shall apply with respect to

Act.

2701

United States.
(O The term "TSUS" means Tariff Schedules of the United
Stales (19 U.S.C 1202).

SEC. 110 EFFECTIVE DATES.

^SsSSlcJlS
loSbf2?iaRiS amendments made by section,
104(b) aSd107 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of Uus
J701

(Hi The term "entered" means entered, or withdrawn from

warehouse for consumption, in the customs territory of the

hirbudos
brlutf
<\»u Rica
IVjminica

P7b?SE^

m Basin

P.L.

(C) has imposed or enforced taxes or other exactions,
restrictive maintenance or operational conditions, or other

measures with respect to property so owned, the effect of

which is to nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize own

ership or control of such property, unless the President
determines that—

(i) prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has

been or is being made to such citizen, corporation.

Restrict ioi

Seizure ul
property

S-67
2
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(4)
141 the degree to which such country follows the accepted

(3)

(ii) good-faith negotiations to provide prompt, ade
quate, and effective compensation under the applicable
provisions of international law are in progress, or such
country is otherwise taking steps to discharge its obli
gations under international law with respect to such
citizen, corporation, partnership, or association, or
(iii) a dispute involving such citizen, corporation,
partnership, or association, over compensation for such

rules of international trade provided for under the General

provisions of the Convention for the Settlement of
upon forum, and

(7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help
measures to promote its own economic development;

the revitalization of the region;

Investment Disputes, or in another mutually agreed

promptly furnishes a copy of such determination to the Senate

I to

and House of Representatives;

(H) the degree to which workers in such country are afforded

reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to organize
and bargain collectively;
<9) the extent to which such country provides under its law

(3) if such country fails to act in good faith in recognizing aa

binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States
citizens or a corporation, partnership or association which is f>0

adequate and effective means for foreign nationals to secure,

per centum or more beneficially owned by United States citi

zens, which have been made by arbitrators appointed for each
case or hy permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties

exercise, and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property,
including patent, trademark, and copyright rights;

involved have submitted their dispute;

(4) if such country affords preferential treatment to the prod
ucts of a developedcountry, other than the United States, which

from engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted material, includ
ing films or television material, belonging to United States
copyright owners without their express consent; and

States commerce, unless the President has received assurances

satisfactory to him that such preferential treatment will be

(11) the extent to which such country is prepared to cooperate
with the United States in the administration of the provisions of
this title.
,
. .

be no such significant adverse effect, and he reports those

insular possessions) is amended by adding at the end thereof the

(10) the extent to which such country prohibits its nationals

has, or is likely to have, a significant adverse effect on United

eliminated or that action will be taken to assure that there will
assurances to the Congress;

(5) if a government-owned entity in such country engages in
the broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or televi
sion material, belonging to United States copyright owner*

(d) General headnote 3(a) of the TSUS (relating to products of the

following paragraph:

"(iv) Subject to the provisions in section 213 of the Caribbean

Basin Economic Recovery Act, articles which are imported from

(0) if such country does not take adequate steps to cooperate
with the United States to prevent narcotic drugs and other
controlled substances (as listed in the schedules in section 202 of

the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of

1970 (21 U.S.C. 812)) produced, processed, or transported insuch
country from entering the United States unlawfully; and
(7) unless such country is a signatory to a treaty, convention,
protocol, or other agreement regarding the extradition or
United States citizens.
...
r
Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) shall not prevent the designation or

any country as a beneficiary country under this Act if the President
determines that such designation will be in the national economic or
security interest of the United States and reports such determina
tion to the Congress with his reasons therefor.

(c) In determining whether to designate any country a beneficiary

country under this title, the President shall take into account(1) an expression by such country of its desire to be so
designated;

,

(2) the economic conditions in such country, the living stand

ards of its inhabitants, and any other economic factors which he
deems appropriate;

(3) the extent to which such country has assured the United

c........ :.

...:n

;,!,. ,.,,i,;»..»,!/. -»m,I r#>:mnn:ible access to the

US

insul

possessioi
19 USC i;

Infra.

insular possessions of the United States shall receive duty

treatment no less favorable than the treatment afforded such
articles when they are imported from a beneficiary country

without their express consent;

rej>ort

19 USC 2...

ments Act of 1979;

(5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or
imposes export performance requirements or local content
requirements which distort international trade;
to) the degree to which the trade policies of such country as
they relate to other beneficiary countries are contributing to

lation

P.L. v
Sec.

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as applicable trade
agreements approved under section 2(a) of the Trade Agree

a seizure has been submitted to arbitration under the

at ions
US
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under such Act.".

•

lei The President shall, after complying with the requirements of

subsection (a)(2), withdraw or suspend the designation of any coun
tryas a beneficiary country if, after such designation, he determines
that as the result of changed circumstances such country would be
barred from designation as a beneficiary country under subsection

Withdraw,

suspension
19 USC 27

(b).
19 USC 27

SEC. 213. ELIGIBLE ARTICLES.

(aXl) Unless otherwise excluded from eligibility by this title, the
duty-free treatment provided under this title shall apply to any

article which is the growth, product, or manufacture of a beneficiary
country if—
. ,
.
_ .
(A) that article is imported directly from a beneficiary coun

try into the customs territory of the United States;and

(B) the sum of (i) the cost or value of the materials produced
in a beneficiary country or two or more beneficiary countries,

plus (ii) the direct costs ofprocessing operations performed in a

beneficiary country or countries is not less than 35 per centum
of the appraised value of such article at the time it is entered.
For purposes of determining the percentage referred to in subparai

,i».

»l. *

"u.w,r^;„r., »niinirvu

inrMurfofi thp Common-

Appraised

J7

(5)
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wealth of Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. If the
cost or value of materials produced in the customs territory of the
United States (other than the Commonwealth of Puerto Ricol n

included with respect to an article to which this paragraph applies.
an amount not to exceed 15 per centum of the appraised value of the
article at the time it is entered that is attributed to such UniU-d

States cost or value may be applied toward determining the percent
age referred to in subparagraph (B).

(2) The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary to carry out this subsection including, but not
limited to, regulations providing that, in order to be eligible for
duty-free treatment under this title, an article must be wholly the
growth, product, or manufacture of a beneficiary country, or must
be a new or different article of commerce which has been grown,

produced, or manufactured in the beneficiary country; but no article
or material of a beneficiary country shall be eligible for such
treatment by virtue of having merely undergone—
(A) simple combining or packaging operations, or
(B) mere dilution with water or mere dilution with another

substance that does not materially alter the characteristics of
the article.
of

(3) As used in this subsection, the phrase "direct costs of process
ing operations" includes, but is not limited to—
(A) all actual labor costs involved in the growth, production,

manufacture, or assembly of the specific merchandise, including

fringe benefits, on-the-job training and the cost of engineering,

supervisory, quality control, and similar personnel; and

(B) dies, molds, tooling, and depreciation on machinery and

equipment which are allocable to the specific merchandise.

Such phrase does not include costs which are not directly attribut

able to the merchandise concerned or are not costs of manufacturing

the product, such as (i) profit, and (ii) general expenses of doing

business which are either not allocable to the specific merchandise
or are not related to the growth, production, manufacture, or assem

bly of the merchandise, such as administrative salaries, casualty
and liability insurance, advertising, and salesmen's salaries, com

Aug. 5
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(6)

(i) sugars, sirups, and molasses provided for in items
155.20and 155.30 of the TSUS, and

the population of. a beneficiary country will not be adversely
affected by changes in land use and land ownership that will
result if increased production of sugar and beef products is
undertaken in response to the duty-free treatment extended
under this title to such products. A Plan must specify such (arts
regarding, and such proposed actions by, a beneficiary country
us the President deems necessary for purposes of carrying out
thissubsection, including but not limited to—
(i) the current levels of food production and nutritional
health of the population;

(ii) current level of production and export of sugai and

beef products;

,

r

(iii) expected increases in production and export ot sugar

and beef products as a result of the duty-free access to the
United States market provided under this title;
(iv) measures to be taken to ensure that the expanded
production of those products because of such dutyfree
access will not occur at the expense ofstable food produc-

t,0(v) proposals for a system to monitor the impact of such

duty-free access on stable food production and land use and

« Ou.,^

this title to sugar ond urf —

product* that are the product of a beneficiary country shall be

J«,innin* on the date of its designation as such a country under
Sn
2?2 doet not submit aplan to the President for evalua

apply to—

^C?M
«lBrffiW&(InS^ng of the operation of the Plan
under^aragraph°5), the President determines that abeneficiary

(1) textile and apparel articles which are subject to textile
(2) footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and

•Plan.

consists of measures and proposals designed to ensure that the
present level of food production in, and the nutritional level ol

te, on the basis of his evaluation, the President determines

agreements;

19 USC I

(ii) articles of beef or veal, however provided for in sub
part Bof part 2 of schedule 1of the TSUS.
,|{iThe term "Plan" means a stable food production plan that

missions or expenses.

(b) The duty-free treatment provided under this title shall not

P.L. S
Sec

Ante, p

thuUhS Plan ofabeneficiary country does not meet the criteria

leather wearing apparel not designated at the time of the

effective date of this title as eligible articles for the purpose of

the generalized system of preferences under title V of the Trade

Consult
with bt-

Act of 1974;

country

.

(3) tuna, prepared or preserved in any manner, in airtight

containers;

(4) petroleum, or any product derived from petroleum, pro
vided for in part 10of schedule 4 of the TSUS;or
(5) watches and watch parts (including cases, bracelets and

straps), of whatever type including, but not limited to, mechani
cal, quartz digital or quartz analog, if such watches or watch
parts contain any material which is the product of any country
with respect to which TSUS column 2 rates of duty apply.
(cXD As used in this subsection—
<\ >Tin. form "fiwimr nn.1 hopf nrodurts" means—

ben.hciary country lorpurpo

country to avoid such suspen-

'sion"'ifnZkffi
Suntry thereafter enters into consultation
If the Deneuciury w™ i 11_j„rt..itPo to formulate remedial
within a «S"g*f*Mta :sha« withhold the suspension of
22?rrE fr^tmentAVcondttion that the remedial action agreed
u^; be appropriately implemented by that country.

LAWS OF 98th CONG.—1st SESS.
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(7)
(4) The President shall monitor on a biennial basis the operation of
the Plans implemented by beneficiary countries, and shall submit u
written report to Congress by March 15 following the close of each
biennium, that—

(A) specifies the extent to which each Plan, and remedial
actions, if any, agreed upon under paragraph (4), have been
implemented; and
(B) evaluates the results of such implementation.
(5) The President shall terminate any suspension of duty-fre*
treatment imposed under this subsection if he determines that the
beneficiary country has taken appropriate action to remedy the
(actors on which the suspension was based.
(d) For such period as there is in effect a proclamation issued by
the President pursuant to the authority vested in him by section 22
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S.C. 624) to protect a price-

support program for sugar beets and sugar cane, the importation
and duty-free treatment of sugars, sirups, and molasses classified
under items 155 20 and 155.30 of the TSUS shall be governed in the
following manner:

(8)

htfht of market conditions. The President, upon the recommen
dation of the Secretary of Agriculture, may suspend the dutyrree treatment for all or part of the quantity of sugar sirups
und molasses permitted to be entered by paragraphs (1KB) and
12) if such action is necessary to protect the price-support pro
gram for sugar beets and sugar cane.

(4) Any quantitative limitation imposed on a beneficiary^coun
try under paragraphs (1KB) and (2) shall apply only to the
Sen hat such limitation permits a lesser quantity of sugar
siruos and molasses to be entered from that country than the

quant it?tnaTwould be permitted to be entered under any other

provision oHaw.
proclamation suspend the duty-free
treatmeL provfded by This title with respect to any eligible article

nA mfw proclaim a duty rate for such article if such action is
itZU'pursuant
Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 or

^nZfSS^^^^^^
to the
lvdidenruyndTsectiJn201<dKl) of the Trade ActCommission
of 1974 regarding

Suspension

19 USC 22:
l!l USC' IW
19 USC 22r

«!r article for which duty-free treatment has been proclaimed by

me President pursuant to this title, the Commission shall state

(IXA) For all beneficiary countries, except those subject to
subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2), duty-free treatment shall
be provided in the same manner as it is provided pursuant to

Whether and toPwhat extent its findings and recommendations apply

title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.), at the
time of the effective date of this title; except that the President

Trade AciTSu. the suspension of the duty-free treatment pro-

upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, may
suspend or adjust upward the value limitation provided for in

P.L. 98
Sec.

L such article when imported from beneficiary countries.

^ For Durooses of subsections (a) and (c) of section 203 of the

19 USC 22

section 504(cKl) of the Trade Act of 1974 on the duty-free

treatment afforded to beneficiary countries under this section if
he finds that such adjustment will not interfere with the price

support program for sugar beets and sugar cane and is appropri
ate in light of market conditions.

19 USC' 2-

(B) As an alternative to subparagraph (A), the President muv

at the request of a beneficiary country not subject to paragraph
(2) and upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agricul
ture, elect to permit sugar, sirups, and molasses from that
country to enter duty-free during a calendar year subject to
quantitative limitations to be established by the President on
the quantity of sugar, sirups, and molasses entered from that

l«J USC' 2

country.

(2) For the following countries whose exports of sugar, sirups,

and molasses in 1981 were not eligible for duty-free treatment
because of the operation of section 504(c) of the Trade Act of
1974, the quantity of sugar, sirups, and molasses which may be
entered in any calendar year shall be limited to no more than

until modified or terminated.

«a;0r «t thp time duty-free
IB) If any article is subject to import* nWf
the g£*£S7££

Ante, p :<

the quantity specified below:

fersswfc S?58%hs ofsubsections

19 USC 2
Emergen

Metric tons:

Dominican Kepublic

Guatemala
Panama

!??•???

210.000
160,000

Such sugar, sirups, and molasses shall be admitted free of duty,
except as provided for in paragraph (3).

(3) The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture, may suspend or adjust upward the quantitative
limitations imposed under paragraph (1KB) or (2) if he deter

treatment is proclaimed f^^^^^^^H^SSTio the
Ml) If apetition is fi ed Withj*f>"tSJa5°{S Trade Act imports
of 1974

pursuant to the provisions of section ^01 01 tnm 'r f

ja^^S^VTffiLMU- to

mines such action will not interfere with the price support

"£ wKta fourteen days after the Ming of a petition under

program for su^ar beets and sugar cane and is appropriate in

rvirmrmnh (1) of this subsection—

relief, pe
filing
19 USC 2

•H 67
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(9)

it

gency action is warranted, he shall advise the President and

recommend that the President take emergency action; or
(B) the Secretary of Agriculture shall publish a notice of his
determination not to recommend the imposition of emergency
action and so advise the petitioner.
(3) Within seven days after the President receives a recommenda
tion from the Secretary of Agriculture to take emergency action

pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, he shall issue a procla
mation withdrawing the duty-free treatment provided by this title

or publish a notice of his determination not to take emergency
action.

(4) The emergency action provided by paragraph (3) of this subsec
tion shall cease to apply—
(A) upon the proclamation of import relief pursuant to section
•1U2

202(aK 1) of the Trade Act of 1974,

(B) on the day the President makes a determination pursuant
to section 203lbK2) of such Act not to impose import relief,
(C) in the event of a report of the United States International
Trade Commission containing a negative finding, on the day the
Commission's report is submitted to the President, or
(D)
.hie

whenever the President determines that because of

changed circumstances such relief is no longer warranted.
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term "perishable product"
means—

(A) live plants provided for in subpart A of part 6 of schedule
: mi

1 of the TSUS;

(B) fresh or chilled vegetables provided for in items 135.10
through 138.42 of the TSUS;
(C) fresh mushrooms provided for in item 144.10 of the TSUS;
(D) fresh fruit provided for in items 140.10, 146.20, 146.30.
140.50 through 146.62, 146.90, 146.91, 147.03 through 147.33,
147.50 through 149.21 and 149.50 of the TSUS;
(E) fresh cut flowers provided for in items 192.17, 192.18, and
192 21 of the TSUS; and

(F) concentrated citrus fruit juice provided for in items 165.25
and 165 35 of the TSUS.

(g) No proclamation issued pursuant to this title shall affect fees
imposed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act

Recovery Act)"; and

I

"United States,", "and not more than 4 liters of which shall have
been produced elsewhere than in such insular possessions, .

ici If the sum of the amounts of taxes covered into the treasuries

of Puerto Rico or the United States Virgin Elands pursuant to

Action 7652(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is reduced
below the amount that would have been covered over if the
.mported rum had been produced in Puerto Rico or the United

non measures and. in this regard, may withdraw the duly-fre.
treatment on rum provided by Ais title. The President shall submit

ureport totheCongress on the measures hetakes.
id) Section 1112 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C.

"Te?NorTtioend pursuant to this title may affect any tariff duty

imposed by the Legislature of Puerto Rico pursuant tosection 319 of

(A) by striking out "50 percent" and inserting in lieu
thereof "70 percent", and
(B) by inserting after "total value", "(or more than 50

Pott, p 35

Report to
Congress

Repeal.
Coffee tar

19 USC l:

IneTariiT Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1319) on coffee imported into Puerto

note.

RTf) For purposes of chapter 1of title II of the Trade Act of'1974.the

"Industry

term "industry" shall include producers located in the United States

inLU,lATdfscharng8e from apoint source in the United States Virgin
Islands in existence on the Sate of the enactment of this subsection
whfch discharS is attributable to the manufacture of rum (as
dXed in parlgraphs (3) of section 7652(c) of the InternalRevenue

Code of 1954) shall not be subject to the requirements of sectioni 301
Towner than toxic pollutant discharges), section 306 or section 403 of
thi> Federal Water Pollution Control Act if—
(I) such discharge occurs at least one thousand five hundred
fee into IheTerritorial sea from the line of ordinary km.water

19 USC 2
note.

3a USC I
note

Post. p. 3*.
33 USC 1
1316. 134.

from that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the
^Mhe Governor of the United States Virgin Islands deter-

mnes that such discharge will not interfere with thej aUainment or maintenance of that water quality which shall assure
pVo"ection of public water supplies, and the protection end

propagation of a balanced peculation of sh.ellfish. §****

wildlife and allow recreat onal activities, in and on the water

andI will not resuTt in the discharge of pollutants in qua" .ties

which mayTreasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable
risk to human health or the environment because ?fbioaccumugenicity), orsynergistic propensities.

(1) by amending clause (i)—

19 USC T,
note.

States Virgin Islands, then the President shall consider compensa-

SEC. 211. MEASURES FOR PUERTO RICO AND UNITED STATES INSULAR

amended—

19 USC 12

Mtid inserting in lieu thereof "5 liters'. and by inserting after

fnHon nersistency in the environment, acute toxicity, chronic

(a) Effective with respect to articles entered on or after the
effective date of this Act, general headnote 3(a) of the TSUS is

Ante. p. *

(2) by amending clause (ii) by striking out 50 percent and
inserting in lieu thereof "70 percent".
lb) Item 813.31 of the TSUS is amended by striking out 4 liters

(7 U.S.C. 624).
POSSESSIONS.
•Mi

(10)

perishable product from a beneficiary country is being imported
into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a
substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the
domestic industry producing a perishable product like or
directly competitive with the imported product and that emer

P.L. ?
Sec.

INT. & DIV. TAX; CARIBBEAN BASIN
scribed in section 213(b) of the Caribbean Basin Economic

(A) if the Secretary of Agriculture has reason to believe that a

K-ndalie

Aug. 5

Aug. 5

tox^y^SfSg carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, or terato

SEC. 2.5. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORTS ON IMPACT OF
THIS ACT.

. . Th„ United States International Trade Commission (herein-

nf *r mthis secUon referred to as the "Commission") shall prepare

nd submit toIK^Congress and to the President, a report regarding

?he ac^te impact of this Act on United States industries an3
consumers during—

19 USC

Submitti

Congress
Presiden

67

(ID

LAWS OF 98th CONG.-1st SKSS.

Aug. 5

Aug.

(12)

(1) the twenty-four-month period beginning with the date of

(2) each calendar year occurring thereafter until duty-free
For purposes of this section, industries in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the insular possessions of the United States shall be
considered to be United States industries.

(bXl) Each report required under subsection (a) shall include, but

not be limited to, an assessment by the Commission regarding—
(A) the actual effect, during the period covered by the report,
of this Act on the United States economy generally as well as on
those specific domestic industries which produce articles that
are like, or directly competitive with, articles being imported
into the United States from beneficiary countries; and

(B) the probable future effect which this Act will have on the

United States economy generally, as well as on such domestic
industries, before the provisions of this Act terminate.

(2) In preparing the assessments required under paragraph (1), the
Commission shall, to the extent practicable—
(A) analyze the production, trade and consumption of United

States products affected by this Act, taking into consideration
employment, profit levels, and use of productive facilities with
respect to the domestic industries concerned, and such other

economic factors in such industries as it considers relevant,
including prices, wages, sales, inventories, patterns of demand,
capital investment, obsolescence of equipment, and diversifica
tion of production; and

(B) describe the nature and extent of any significant change
in employment, profit levels, and use of productive facilities,

P.L. 98-6
Sec. 22:

(1) facilitate cooperation between public and private entities
interesled in engaging in or furthering Caribbean trade;
(2)^crve as acatalyst for greater cultural exchange between
the United States and Caribbean nations; and
fu0,Tn:tPH

enactment of this Act; and

treatment under this title is terminated under section 21(>(b>

INT. & DIV. TAX; CARIBBEAN BASIN

131 facilitate expansion ofjob opportunities both in the United
...
• »•
The study shall also include suggestions regarding the organwition
and staffing of such an institute.
....
. s..„j #« #u«
c) The study required by this section shall be submitted to the
States and the Caribbean Basin.

iihmillal to

Congress within six months after the date of the enactment of this
Act.

SH 21H. EFFECTIVE DATE OF SUBTITLE AND TERMINATION OF DUTY

I!l USC270C.

FREE TREATMENT.

la) Effective DATE.-This subtitle shall take effect on the date or

^^m£™owAfton-r***
Treatment-No duty-free treatnient extoided to beneficiary countries under this subtitle shall
remain in effect after September 30, 199o.

Subtitle B—Tax Provisions

KIT 221 PXYMENT OF EXCISE TAXES COLLECTED ON RUM TO PUERTO
RICO AND THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS,

lal In CFNERAL.-Section 7652 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1U54 relating toshipments to the United States) is amended by
nserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection.

2ti USC ~G.rC'

and such other conditions as it deems relevant in the domestic

industries concerned, which it believes are attributable to this

J». USC AMI

Act.
•VV-l

(c)(1) Each report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted
to the Congress and to the President before the close of the ninemonth period beginning on the day after the last day of the period
covered by the report.

^St^tS£ prescribes FORMULA.-The Secretary shall

by the public, either orally or in writing, or both, of information
relating to matters that will be addressed in the reports.

^ttXWR a^rmethods for transferring

(2) The Commission shall provide opportunity for the submission

SEC. 21fi. IMPACT STUDY ItY SECRETARY OF I.AIIOR.

The Secretary of Labor, in consulation with other appropriate

Federal agencies, shall undertake a continuing review and analysis
of the impact which the implementation of the provisions of this
title have with respect to United States labor; and shall make an
annual written report to Congress on the results of such review and
analysis.
SEC.

217.

FEASIBILITY

STUDY

REGARDING

A

CARlllltEAN

S ^S^^^^^^r^^^ tPo tax
under subsection (a) or lb). .

mQA0 h« subsection (a)

note

TRADE

INSTITUTE.

(a) The Secretary of State shall prepare a study regarding the
feasibility of establishing a Caribbean Trade Institute in Harlem,
New York City, supported by a combination of Federal and private
funds.

<b) The study shall include, but not be limited to. an assessment of

a; ust 7«;.r.:

1983
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Tablo 16.—Jamaica: Loading U.S. Domostic oxports, F

a.©, valuo

(Thousands of dollars)

Tim© period*
> commodity

all commodi tios

>tal

............••••••••••••

-Oil (not crudo) fro» p©tr©l 8 bitum minoral ©tc...

10-

-Sodium hydrox; pot«©a hydrox; sod or potass P"«*ox.

115-

-Est. low valu© shpi canadl©n low valu© and nlk....

18009101-

-T-shirts, singlats, tank top© ©tc, knit or croch©t

-Hhoat ©nd moslln
••*"•.:
1; LI '1 ' 'iAin
i31- -Parts for machinery ©f h«©dlngs 8425 to 8430

105- -Corn
10612-

(maiz©)

-Track'suits;'ski:suit»«*©wii^©a^

or crochot

-Bras, girdlo*, gartors ©tc, knlttod ©tc or not...

!12!01- -Soybeans, whothor or not brokon ••••••
03- -Motor cars 8 vohicl©s-for transporting

parsons

0110-

?07!0308i17103115I03104i07.07102-

741,286
60,354
28,96 3
19,938
7,074
18,012
12,572
19,363
20,640
4,124
11,132
10,240
2,999
6,083
5,631
20,376
6,932
671
424
3,194

9,223
783

-Birds''oggo, in th© sh©ll. fr©sh, pr©s©rv or cookd
-Expts charity nosoli Impt© r©turn 9^%elm,m^mwt

-5ood ©awn or ch1PP©d lonoth, jllc©d .tc, ov6m» th

?08♦ 71♦ 38J0<*~
♦ 09104J10J09-

5,708
3,831
27,608
7,615
1,015
3,840
3,725
7,235
5,079

2,366
2,314
11,157
3,898
3,120
357,237
384,049

708*13-

Dtal
Dtal

IQQI

1988

984,278
118,950
45,506
31,564
24,165
17,569
16,392
22,214
16,923
4,998
11,796
18,287
10,467

916,802
135,185
59,506
38,028
27,260
19,187
19,586
21,000
19,302
12,863
13,575
12,930
16,846

16,635
13,300
18,761

12,188
8,472

6,560
4,044
3,221
4,069
9,608
2,900
5,244
6,180

13,451
4,973
3,524
7,068
5,826
2,109
5,108
17,490
7,000
6,378

5,573
5,661
513,511
470,767

othor

ffoTo"
Sour c©<

Top 35

Dat© b©foro 1989 ar© •»t1wat©d.

Co«P11©d froai official ©t©tl»tic. of th© U.S.

niModltt©© »ort©d by Do«i©st1c ©xport©, F.©.».
COMMO

Dop«rt«©nt of Cowmorc©.
alu© In 1990 J©nu©ry-Jun<

7,720
7,869
7,884
3.919
9,037
7,958
5,990
6,255
6,045
6,682
7,471
4,666
5,764
5,257
3,141
4,366
3,475
4,552
4,552
4,824
4,337
537,687
379,115

438,375
54.342
32,858

470,151
49,386

18,39(1

18,806
20,676
6,232
10,828
9,312
8,902

12,484
12,426
11,060
10,908
8,724
7,422
6,8 36
6,786
6.424
5.585
5.027

4,447
4,034
4,032
3,725
3,723
3,632
3,510
3,418
3,333
3,221
3.193
2,887
2,727
2,336
2,318
2,288
2,258
2,206
2,200
2,121
2,118

263,002
175,373

41,266

17

7,884
7,859
11,652
4,407
584

5,129
4,769
5,671
4,279
6,500
4,390
108
1,421
3,342

7,847
2.357
1,372
6,531
1,905
1,262
1,725
1,282
2,617
2,249
2,346
2,246
267,159

202,992

SZ^32t

APPENDIX D
THE JAMAICAN DOLLAR

Excerpt from the "Jamaican Newsletter, December 1991

"Jamaica Completely Liberalizes Foreign Exchange Market"
The new system means foreign investors and Jamaicans may nowfreely move foreign
currency in and out of the country. Exporters, other earners offoreign exchange and all
Jamaicans may now maintain foreign currency accounts locally or abroad without restriction.
All exchange controls on interest, profits, dividends and travel have been lifted as part of the
overall economic reform strategy. This move is intended to stabilize the Jamaican dollar,
encourage investment and exports and end the black market inforeign currency (once andfor
all).

Manley, in speech, Sept. 21, said that the Jamaican dollar has beenfalling while the
economy was improving. He stated that the dollar fell "not because dollars are short, but

because people are speculating." "By liberalizing, we aim to create oneforeign exchange
market instead of two, leading to an eventual stabilization of the rate. This will lead to the
growth of exports and investments which is the best means of being able to afford to do the
necessarythingsfor thepoor."

"(stringent fiscal and monetary policies necessary) to make sure the supply of JD is
restricted...no surplus available to speculate in foreign exchange, thereby depressing the
exchange rate."

The result is that interest rates will increasefor a time to remove excess liquidityfrom the
system. The JD is still the only legal tender on the island; only licenseddealers are allowed to
trade inforeign currency as in most countries.

Message from Ambassador Dr. Richard Bernal, December 1991

M... one ofthe last steps in the economic adjustment program was achieved when we completely
liberalized ourforeign exchange market. This will help to establish the real rate for our dollar
basedupon true marketforces. Initial result is depreciation in the rate ofexchangefor the JD,
resulting in inflationary pressures in the economy. Recognize that this was an absolutely
necessary measure...more adequately reflects demand and supply and has made our export and
our tourist sector morecompetitive."

Appendix D (cont'd)
Mr. Malcolm Forbes, Jr. of Forbes Magazine at a recent Private Sector

Organization of Jamaica banquet, said, "The Caribbean and Latin America is
becoming the new Pacific Rim."
He also said:

" There are four basic principles countries must adhere to if they want their economies to grow:
1) a sound currency, 2) a sensible tax regime, 3) respect for property rights, and 4) procedures to
make it easier for people to set up businesses."

"If an economy is to grow it must have real or sound money. You don't get an economy to grow
if you're always changing your money."

Excerpt from article "Liberalization and the Social Sector in Jamaica" by Norman
Girvan, The Sunday Gleaner. (Jamaica), Feb. 9,1992.
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MONETARY POLICY PHASES OF THE PNP
GOVERNMENT

* Exchange Rate

Type

Monet. Policv

Auction

Expansionary

5.50-6.19

2. Nov 1989- Sept 1990

Fixed Rate

Restrictive

6.50-7.00

3. Sept 1990-Sept 1991

Inter-Bank

Expansionary

7.45 -12.00

4.** Sept 1991-Present

Liberalized

Restrictive

16.50-22.00

1.

Feb-October 1989

* To the U.S. Dollar

** Now the Bank of Jamaica (National Bank) was required to bid for US$ from the
commercial banks like everyone else.
" What happened? This action of Sept. 1991 further de-stabilized the JD by legalizing and
facilitating speculative behavior. Now it has declined to well below the black market rate was."
"...encourages speculation in non-productive ventures like real estate and stock market."

